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ABSTRACT
Around 2005, maritime piracy made a troubling resurgence three quarters
of a century after a consensus had been reached that the age of piracy
had permanently ended. Yet piracy returned in a slightly different form,
with pirates relying more on land-based facilitators than their historical
counterparts. Maritime piracy’s reappearance made ripe for consideration
the question of whether a facilitator of maritime piracy must be physically
present on the high seas while facilitating in order to be subject to
universal jurisdiction. This Article undertakes an analysis of the text,
statutory context, history, and policy impetus behind UNCLOS art. 101
as it relates to universal jurisdiction over facilitators. It finds that the
weight of the evidence suggests that a high seas requirement in fact
exists for facilitators of piracy jure gentium. From there, the article
considers the likely implications of such a requirement on modern
facilitators of maritime piracy. Through the lens of political economy,
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the Article asserts that universal jurisdiction piracy prosecutions pose
something of a commons problem, or, alternatively, a public goods
problem. Because rational actors operating in a market tend to internalize
externalities and under-produce public goods, this theory suggests that
universal jurisdiction prosecutions should be quite rare, and state practice
confirms that hypothesis. In short, this article argues that there is a high
seas requirement for inciters and intentional facilitators of piracy jure
gentium, but the existence of this requirement is unlikely to affect the
impunity of facilitators.
Can it be believed that the legislature intended to punish with death the subject
of a foreign prince, who, within the dominions of that prince, should advise a
person, about to sail in the ship of his sovereign, to commit murder or robbery?

- Chief Justice John Marshall, United States Supreme Court1
I. INTRODUCTION
Chief Justice Marshall posed the above question regarding a 1790
statute which punished accessories before and after the fact to acts of
maritime piracy in the 1818 case United States v. Palmer.2 Although the
Chief Justice intended the question as a hypothetical that should be
answered in the negative, it remained just that—a hypothetical—for
almost two centuries.
Then, in 2011, United States law enforcement officials arrested Ali
Mohamed Ali when his plane landed at Dulles International Airport.3
Ali, who was serving as Director General of the Ministry of Education in
Somaliland, was en route to an educational conference in North Carolina.
He was charged with inter alia, piracy under the law of nations.4 A
Somali citizen, Ali was charged with negotiating on behalf of other
Somalis who captured a Bahamian-flagged, Danish-owned ship and held
its Russian, Georgian, and Estonian crew hostage for sixty-nine days.5
His prosecution in the U.S. is therefore predicated purely on the theory

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. 610, 633 (1818).
Punishment of Crimes Act of 1790, ch. 9, §§ 10–11, 1 Stat. 112, 114.
United States v. Ali, 885 F. Supp. 2d 17, 21 (D.D.C. 2012).
Id.
Id.
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of universal jurisdiction6 since the government stipulated that Ali did not
intentionally facilitate piracy while physically present on the high seas.7
Around the same time, a federal grand jury charged Mohammad Saali
Shibin for his role as a negotiator in the hijacking of the MV Marida
Marguerite, a German-owned Marshall Islands flagged vessel with a
crew of nineteen Indians, two Bangladeshis, and one Ukrainian.8 Like
Ali, Shibin did not board the ship until it was “just off the coast of
Somalia,” so the United States’ case against him for his actions aboard
the Marida Marguerite rests solely on the theory of universal jurisdiction.
Thus Ali and Shibin, the subjects of a foreign “prince” and “within the
dominion of that prince,” both advised persons who had just sailed the
high seas how to successfully complete the robbery. They thereby
transformed Chief Justice Marshall’s question from hypothetical into
reality. After 200 years, the question of whether universal jurisdiction
exists for facilitators of piracy who do not facilitate from the high seas or
any other place outside the jurisdiction of a state is finally ripe for
serious consideration.
The ripeness of the question of a high seas requirement for facilitators
of piracy goes beyond the purely legal. It speaks directly to the manner
in which the international community goes about bringing an end to the
scourge of piracy on the high seas. The geography of Somalia, combined
with a lack of economic opportunities in the state, has led to a situation
with no shortage of Somali men and boys willing to risk their lives as
pirates. Prosecuting individuals higher up on the criminal conspiracy
chain, those who invariably operate from within the territory of a single
state, is seen as a more effective method of achieving deterrence through
criminal justice than low-level prosecutions alone.9 Thus whether there

6. See Eugene Volokh, From Prof. Eugene Kontorovich, About Today’s Piracy
Decision, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 13, 2012, 5:50 PM), http://www.volokh.
com/2012/07/13/from-prof-eugene-kontorovich-about-todays-piracy-decision/.
7. Martha Neil, Federal Judge Blasts US Prosecutors for “Unbelievably Inexcusable
Behavior” in Somali Piracy Case, A.B.A J. (July 23, 2012, 5:15 PM), http://www.
abajournal.com/news/article/federal_judge_blasts_prosecution_in_somali_piracy_case_for
_unbelievably_ine/.
8. United States v. Shibin, No. 2:11CR33, 2012 WL 8231152, at *1-2 (E.D. Va.
Apr. 16, 2012). Also note Shibin was charged for his role in the hijacking of the Quest in
which four United States citizens were killed. Id. at *1. Because the United States has
jurisdiction over Shibin under the passive personality theory of jurisdiction, Shibin’s role
in the Quest raises separate legal questions from the ones addressed here.
9. See Andrew Shapiro, Assistant Sec’y, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs,
Remarks to International Institute for Strategic Studies: U.S. Approaches to CounterPiracy (Mar. 30, 2011), available at http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rm/159419.htm
(“Furthermore, [the U.S. Department of State is] looking at additional ways to more
aggressively target those who organize, lead, and profit from piracy operations, including
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is a high seas requirement for land-based facilitators has a direct bearing
on the optimal strategy for gathering evidence against and prosecuting
those most responsible for the resurgence of piracy off the Horn of
Africa. This paper seeks to address both the legal question of whether a
high seas requirement exists and the practical results that flow from the
disposition of that question. It argues that there is indeed a high seas
requirement for facilitators of piracy jure gentium under customary
international law as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), but such a requirement is not likely to result
in impunity for inciters and intentional facilitators of piracy who operate
solely from dry land.
Part II of this article characterizes the uncertainty around a high seas
requirement for pirate facilitators, providing some historical context to
the legal debate. Part III considers whether there is a high seas requirement
for facilitators of piracy jure gentium.It concludes that, while the question is
ultimately one that will be answered by state practice, there is strong
evidence suggesting that UNCLOS and customary international law
place a high seas requirement on pirate facilitators. In considering this
question, Part III evaluates the text of UNCLOS art. 101, its context,
drafting history, and several plausible policy reasons for piracy’s status
as the original—and for centuries the sole—universal jurisdiction offense.
Part IV shifts focus from whether there is a high seas requirement to
what the implications of such a requirement might be. Political economic
theory predicts very few universal jurisdiction piracy prosecutions, and
state practice shows that such prosecutions are quite rare. Ultimately,
Part IV concludes that the existence of a high seas requirement for
facilitators of piracy will have a very limited effect on impunity of
facilitators. Part V provides some concluding remarks.
II. THE SOURCE OF THE LEGAL UNCERTAINTY
The respective histories of the crime of maritime piracy and the
positive international law regulating maritime piracy overlap less than
one might imagine. This is due to the fact that most positive international
law dealing with piracy was codified during a time when actual incidents

disrupting the financial networks that support them.”); see also ROBERT HAYWOOD &
ROBERTA SPIVAK, MARITIME PIRACY 106–11 (2012).
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of piracy were relatively rare.10 One possible consequence of this lack of
overlap is that the law of maritime piracy may not fully account for its
modern nature.11 In its modern resurgence, pirate tactics changed markedly.
Modern pirates rely much more on land-based facilitators, ranging from
investors to hostage negotiators, than did their historical counterparts. As
a result of this increased reliance, the question of whether inciters and
intentional facilitators of piracy are subject to a high seas requirement
has become as important as it is unsettled.

The above figure illustrates this phenomenon nicely. The line graph
was made using Google’s Ngram service,12 a tool that allows users to
track the use of a given word or phrase in proportion to all words or
phrases that appeared in eight million of the approximately twenty million
books scanned by Google to date.13 The data suggest that maritime
piracy was important until the turn of the twentieth century, after which
it was given much less attention. The issue was not revived until the turn
10. See Scott Davidson, Dangerous waters: Combating maritime piracy in Asia, 9
ASIAN Y.B. INT’L L. 3, 5 (2000) (“There was a lack of attention devoted to the drafting of
the provisions on piracy at UNCLOS III; it is attributable to the fact that, by that time, it
was thought that maritime piracy was of such little practical concern . . . as to require
scant consideration.”).
11.
Id.
12. GOOGLE BOOKS NGRAM VIEWER, http://books.google.com/ngrams/ (last visited
Feb. 4, 2013).
13. Ben Zimmer, Bigger, Better Google Ngrams: Brace Yourself for the Power of
Grammar, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 18, 2012, 10:20 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/
technology/archive/2010/10/bigger-better-google-ngrams-brace-yourself-for-the-power-ofgrammar/263487.
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of the twenty-first century. Nonetheless, as the chart also illustrates,
virtually all of the positive international law concerning maritime piracy
was considered and codified during piracy’s wane. The narrative history
of maritime piracy and the law governing such piracy mirrors the graphic
representation above to a considerable extent.
The earliest references to piracy can be found in cuneiform writings
dating around 2000 B.C.,14 and robbery and violence on the high seas
has captured the public imagination ever since. The popular image of
pirates seems frozen around piracy’s “Golden Age,”15 during which
Barbary pirates played a role in the capture and enslavement of European
travelers between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries.16 This was
undoubtedly the peak of piracy at sea. By 1932 the British historian Philip
Gosse asserted that the age of piracy had “permanently ended.”17 Indeed,
twentieth century piracy was marked by sporadic, low-level attacks such
that Gosse’s 1932 assertion began to appear quite prescient.18 However, the
early twenty-first century saw a troubling resurgence of maritime piracy,
particularly off the horn of Africa, where in 2010 pirates attacked 445 ships,
hijacked 53 ships, and captured 1,181 hostages.19 After a seventy year lull
that occurred roughly between 1930 and 2000, maritime piracy was once
again a practical issue for lawmakers and lawyers to grapple with.
Early on, the positive law that criminalized maritime piracy closely
tracked the crime it attempted to regulate. Though pirates had been
executed for millennia regardless of their nationality, Cicero is widely
regarded as coining the phrase communis hostis omnium, or “common
enemies of the world” in the first century B.C. to describe pirates as
criminals of a fundamentally international character.20 Just as piracy
experienced its “Golden Age” between the sixteenth and eighteenth
14. HAYWOOD & SPIVAK, supra note 9, at 24.
15. FRANK SHERRY, RAIDERS AND REBELS: THE GOLDEN AGE OF PIRACY 7 (1986).
16. See ROBERT C. DAVIS, CHRISTIAN SLAVES, MUSLIM MASTERS: WHITE SLAVERY
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, THE BARBARY COAST, AND ITALY, 1500-1800 141 (2003).
17. PHILIP GOSSE, THE HISTORY OF PIRACY 297–98 (1932).
18. See, e.g., Andrew Mwangura, Indian Ocean Piracy: 1990-2001, ECOP (Sept.
2, 2001), http://www.ecop.info/english/ind-oce-pir-1990-2001.htm (noting that only six
pirate attacks occurred off the coast of Somalia between 1990 and 2001).
19. ICC INT’L MAR. BUREAU ANN. REP. 1 JAN.–31 DEC. 2010, PIRACY AND ARMED
ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS (Jan. 2011) (on file with the author); see also Pirates seized
record 1,181 hostages in 2010–report, BBC NEWS (Jan. 18, 2011, 5:23 AM), http://www.
bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12214905.
20. See M. TULLIUS CICERO, CICERO IN TWENTY-EIGHT VOLUMES: DE OFFICIIS [ON
DUTIES] 385 (Walter Miller trans., 1913).
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centuries, early transnational regulation of piracy peaked in 1684 when
the English Parliament passed An Act for the More Effectual Suppression
of Piracy. This act established Vice Admiralty Courts throughout the
British Empire in an attempt to sentence pirates.21 Several centuries
later, only five years before Philip Gosse proclaimed piracy dead, the
International Court of Justice found that maritime piracy was a crime
against the law of nations, noting, “in its jurisdictional aspects, [piracy]
is sui generis.”22
Yet during the twentieth century, the practice of maritime piracy
began to diverge from its regulation. Though the actual incidence of piracy
dropped markedly between 1930 and 2000, it was during this period that
the international law of maritime piracy—including its definition—was
codified and ultimately accepted as part of customary international law.
The modern definition of piracy was first announced in a comprehensive
manner as part of the 1932 Harvard Draft Convention on Piracy.23 It was
then modified slightly by the International Law Commission in 1956 for
inclusion in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas,24 and was
subsequently copied verbatim from the Geneva Convention into the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1982.25 By the
year 2000, 134 countries had ratified UNCLOS.26 Today, even countries
that have not ratified the treaty, such as the United States, have accepted
the UNCLOS definition of piracy as an accurate reflection of customary
international law.27
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, however, high seas piracy
returned in a different, less centralized form from the one it took in years
prior. Historically, maritime piracy occurred entirely at sea, as the pirate
ship approached the victim ship, boarded it, robbed it, and sailed away.
Today, Somali piracy, which represents over half of contemporary global
attacks,28 more closely resembles an organized crime syndicate than the
21.

An Act for the More Effectual Suppression of Piracy, in 3 BRITISH PIRACY IN
at 59–60 (Joel H. Baer ed.,

THE GOLDEN AGE: HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION, 1660-1730,

2007).
22. S.S. “Lotus” (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment No. 9, 1927 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 10, at
70 (Sept. 7).
23. Harvard Law School, Draft Convention on Piracy, with Comment, 26 AM. J.
INT’L L. 739, 749 (Supp. 1932) [hereinafter Harvard Draft Convention].
24. Geneva Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 11
[hereinafter Geneva Convention].
25. UNCLOS, infra note 32.
26. See Chronological lists, infra note 34.
27. See U.S. DIGEST OF INT’L LAW, infra note 34.
28. 2011 Piracy Attacks Totaled 439; 275 off Somalia: ICC/IMB Report, INS. J.
(Jan. 19, 2012), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/ international/2012/01/19/231822.htm
(noting that Somali pirates accounted for approximately 54% of attacks on ships in 2011).
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antics of Captain Jack Sparrow. Rather than simply robbing the victim
ship, Somali pirates board a large merchant vessel and hold its cargo and
crew hostage, reaping ransoms that averaged around $5 million in 2011.29
Moreover, modern pirates rely on territorially-based support, which comes
from financiers on the front end,30 local suppliers of provisions during the
ordeal, and hostage negotiators on the back-end.31 In fact, due to the
relative abundance of Somalis willing to act as low-level pirates, many
view the prosecution of land-based operators as the most effective use of
judicial mechanisms to end the scourge of piracy.32
In sum, pirates’ shifting tactics have led to a great deal of uncertainty
around a high seas requirement for pirate facilitators. Therefore, a definitive
answer to the question of jurisdiction is more important than ever. The
following section seeks to answer the question in a way that, even if not
definitive, should provide a starting point for further consideration
and debate.
III. A HIGH SEAS REQUIREMENT FOR FACILITATION OF
PIRACY JURE GENTIUM
It is abundantly clear that piracy under the law of nations, or piracy
jure gentium, is a crime of universal jurisdiction.33 It is equally clear that

29. Anna Bowden & Shikah Basnet, The Economic Cost of Somali Piracy 2011 at
11 (One Earth Future Found., Working Paper, 2011) [hereinafter ECOP], available at http://
oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/economic_cost_of_piracy_2011.pdf [hereinafter
ECOP].
30. See, e.g., Anthony O’Donnell, Pirate Financiers See Robust Returns in Tough
Economy, INS. J. (Sept. 19, 2012), http://www.insurancetech.com/security/pirate-financierssee-robust-returns-in/240007590.
31. See, e.g., Sarah Wolfe, Somali pirate gets 12 life terms in boat hijackings,
GLOBAL POST (Aug. 13, 2012, 4:48 PM), http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/
americas/united-states/120813/somali-pirate-gets-12-life-terms-boat-hijackings; Toan QuyDo et al., The Pirates of Somalia: Ending the Threat, Rebuilding a Nation at xxiv (World
Bank Report, 2013) [hereinafter World Bank Report], available at http://www-wds.worldbank.
org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2013/05/06/00033303720130506120556/
Rendered/PDF/767130WP0REPLA0alia0main0report0web.pdf.
32. See Shapiro, supra note 9; see also HAYWOOD & SPIVAK, supra note 9.
33. E.g., United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 105, Dec. 10,
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS] (“On the high seas, or in any other
place outside the jurisdiction of any State, every State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft,
or a ship or aircraft taken by piracy and under the control of pirates, and arrest the
persons and seize the property on board. The courts of the State which carried out the
seizure may decide upon the penalties to be imposed . . . .”).
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the definition of piracy under customary international law is reflected in
art. 101 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS), 34 which states:
Piracy consists of any of the following acts:
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of
depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the
passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft,
or against persons or property on board such ship or
aircraft;
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place
outside the jurisdiction of any State;
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship
or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate
ship or aircraft;
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act
described in subparagraph (a) or (b).35
The outer bounds of universal jurisdiction over maritime piracy, however,
are much less apparent. Particularly, it remains an open question whether
an inciter or intentional facilitator of piracy (hereinafter simply referred
to as a “facilitator”) must be physically present on the high seas to commit
piracy jure gentium and therefore be subject to universal jurisdiction.
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties applies a general rule
of interpretation that the language of treaties is to be primarily interpreted in
accordance with the ordinary meaning of the terms used in the context of
the treaty as a whole.36 If this general approach leaves the meaning of
the terms in question ambiguous or obscure, the Vienna Convention
states, “[r]ecourse may be had to ary means of interpretation, including

34. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISER, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, DIGEST OF
UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: 2010, 111 (Elizabeth R. Wilcox ed.,
2011) [hereinafter U.S. DIGEST OF INT’L LAW], available at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/179316.pdf (“[T]he actions and statements of the Executive Branch over
more than six decades reflect the consistent U.S. view that [the UNCLOS art. 101]
definition is both reflective of customary international law and universally accepted
by states.”); see also U.N. Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea,
Chronological lists of ratifications of, accessions and successions to the Convention and
the related Agreements as of 23 January 2013 (Jan. 23, 2013), http://www.un.org/
Depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm [hereinafter Chronological
lists] (listing the 165 states that have ratified UNCLOS).
35. UNCLOS, supra note 33, art. 101.
36. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
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the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its
conclusion . . . .”37
Although scholars have rightly pointed out that the Vienna Convention is
not the sole authority of treaty interpretation under international law,38 it
is an excellent starting point for any interpretive endeavor. Moreover, it
is especially well suited to the task at hand due to the relationship
between UNCLOS and customary international law. With the Vienna
Convention’s prescriptions in mind, this section examines the plain
language, statutory context, drafting history, and underlying policy rationale
behind UNCLOS art. 101(c) and concludes that, although the question
remains one to be answered by state practice, a high seas requirement for
pirate facilitators appears to exist under international law.
A. The Plain Language of UNCLOS Art. 101 is Ambiguous
as to a High Seas Requirement
Opponents of a high seas requirement contrast the language of
UNCLOS arts. 101(a) and 101(c) as their primary argument against such
a requirement. The phrase, “on the high seas,” opponents note, is present
in art. 101(a)39 and absent in art. 101(c).40 This phrase carries an enormous
amount of weight in opponents’ arguments, who assert that the only
plausible reading of the divergence between arts. 101(a) and (c)—which
address direct perpetrators of piracy and facilitators of piracy, respectively
—is that a high seas requirement exists for direct perpetrators and not for
facilitators. Proponents of a high seas requirement for facilitators offer
an alternative plausible reading of the text: that “on the high seas” was
meant to differentiate high seas piracies from those occurring on terra
nullius. These dual readings render the text of UNCLOS art. 101
ambiguous as to a high seas requirement for facilitators.
The strongest argument against a high seas requirement for pirate
facilitators comes from a purely textual analysis, contrasting the language of
UNCLOS art. 101(a) with the language of UNCLOS art. 101(c). Art. 101(a)
relates to the actual perpetrators of piracy and states, in pertinent part, that
“[p]iracy consists of . . . any illegal acts of violence or detention . . .
37. Id. art. 32.
38. E.g., Zhang Nai-gen, On International Law of Treaty Interpretation, 6 CAN.
SOC. SCI., no. 6, 2010, at 16–17 (describing alternative methods of treaty interpretation).
39. UNCLOS, supra note 33, art. 101(a).
40. Id. art. 101(c).
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directed . . . on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against
persons or property on board such ship or aircraft . . . [or] against a ship,
aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any
State. . . .”41 Contrast the language in art. 101(a) with that contained in
101(c), the section concerning facilitators, which says that piracy also
consists of “. . . any act of inciting or intentionally facilitating an act
described in subparagraph (a) . . . .”42
Conspicuously absent from art. 101(c), opponents argue, is the
modifier “on the high seas” contained in art. 101(a) and applied to direct
perpetrators.43 From this discrepancy, opponents conclude that UNCLOS
creates discrete piracy offenses, one of which is governed by art. 101(a)
and contains a high seas requirement and another that is governed by art.
101(c) and contains no such requirement.44 They argue that, if acts of
facilitation must occur on the high seas along with direct acts of
perpetration, the “high seas” language used in UNCLOS art. 101(a)(i)
would be rendered otiose.45 However, there is an equally plausible reading
of the plain language of UNCLOS art. 101 that leaves room for a high
seas requirement for pirate facilitators.
Under this alternative reading, there are three classes of acts that
constitute piracy jure gentium—direct commission, voluntary participation
in the operation of a pirate ship, and acts of facilitation—and each must
be committed from the high seas or a place outside the territorial
jurisdiction of any state for universal jurisdiction to attach. For proponents,
the presence of the phrase, “[o]n the high seas” in art. 101(a)(i) reflects
the drafters’ concern with clarifying that piracy jure gentium could be
committed against victims on the high seas or on terra nullius, the latter
case being described in UNCLOS art. 101(a)(ii) as “a place outside the
41. UNCLOS, supra note 33, art. 101(a).
42. Id. art. 101(c).
43. Id. art. 101(a), (c).
44. See Douglas Guilfoyle, Committing Piracy on Dry Land: Liability for
Facilitating Piracy, EJIL: TALK! (July 26, 2012), http://www.ejiltalk.org/committingpiracy-on-dry-land-liability-for-facilitating-piracy/; see also Roger L. Phillips, Intentional
Facilitation and Commission of Piracy as part of a Joint Criminal Enterprise, COMMUNIS
HOSTIS OMNIUM (July 26, 2012), http://piracy-law.com/2012/07/26/intentional-facilitationand-commission-of-piracy-as-part-of-a-joint-criminal-enterprise/; Roger L. Phillips, Pirate
Accessory Liability: Developing a Modern Legal Regime Governing Incitement and
Intentional Facilitation of Maritime Piracy, 25 FLA. J. INT’L L. 271, 293–94 (2013),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2158023; Int’l Mar. Org., U.N. Division for Ocean
Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Piracy: elements of national legislation pursuant to the
U.N. Convention of the Law of the Sea, 1982, at 4 n.15, LEG 98/8/1 (May 17, 2011)
[hereinafter IMO, Piracy], available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/piracy/circular_letter_
3180.pdf (noting that art. 101(c) does “not explicitly set forth any particular geographic
scope”).
45. See Guilfoyle, supra note 40 (in the comments section following the article).
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jurisdiction of any State.”46 In other words, “on the high seas” refers more
to the location of the victim than the perpetrator of piracy jure gentium.
Support for such a reading can be found both in the overall structure
of the article and through a close reading of sections (a)(i) and (a)(ii). As
for the overall structure, the chapeaux to art. 101 clearly states, “[p]iracy
consists of the following acts . . . .”47 Thus, the plain language of the
chapeaux more strongly supports the view of three separate acts constituting
a single international offense rather than three separate international
offenses with discrete jurisdictional requirements. Additionally, there is
a great deal of substantive parallelism in sections (a)(i) and (a)(ii) suggesting
that they serve to describe two contexts in which piracy jure gentium could
occur, leading to the conclusion that “on the high seas” has nothing to do
with facilitators.
Art. 101(a)(i) refers to attacks “directed . . . on the high seas, against
another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such
ship or aircraft.”48 This subsection contains a geographic limitation (“on
the high seas”) and a description of possible objects of piracy (“another
ship or aircraft, or . . . persons or property on board such ship or aircraft.”).49
Similarly, art. 101(a)(ii) contains a geographic limitation (“in a place
outside the jurisdiction of any State”) alongside a description of the
possible objects of an attack (“a ship, aircraft, persons or property”).50
To be sure, the substantive parallelism described above would be more
readily apparent if it were coupled with structural parallelism between
arts. 101(a)(i) and (ii). For example, if art. 101(a)(i) read, “directed . . .
against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property aboard such
an aircraft, on the high seas,” the geographic and objective directives
contained in both sections would be written in the same order. The converse
is also true. If art. 101(a)(ii) read, “directed . . . in a place outside the
territorial jurisdiction of any State, against a ship, aircraft, persons, or
46. UNCLOS, supra note 33, art. 101; see also Report of the International Law
Commission to the General Assembly, [1956] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 253, cmt. 4, at
282, U.N. Doc A/3159 (1956) [hereinafter 1956 ILC Draft Articles], available at
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc//texts/instruments/english/commentaries/8_1_8_2_1956.pdf (“In
considering as ‘piracy’ acts committed in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State, the
Commission had chiefly in mind acts committed by a ship or aircraft on an island
constituting terra nullius or on the shores of an unoccupied territory.”).
47. UNCLOS, supra note 33, art. 101.
48. Id. art. 101(a)(i).
49. Id.
50. Id. art. 101(a)(ii).
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property,” it would be clear that arts. 101(a)(i) and (ii) do nothing more
than differentiate piracy on the high seas from piracy on terra nullius,
and include both in the definition of piracy jure gentium.
When viewed through the prism of the proponents’ argument, the
semantic differences between arts. 101(a)(i) and (ii) are so easily
explainable they seem trite. First, art. 101(a)(i) refers to “another ship”
while 101(a)(ii) simply mentions “a ship.”51 This discrepancy comes
from the oft-cited “two-ship” requirement for piracy on the high seas,
which is meant to exclude acts of mutiny from the definition of piracy
jure gentium.52 Such a requirement would be wholly irrational if applied
on land, where ocean-going ships do not operate.
Second, art. 101(a)(i) modifies “persons or property” with “on board
such ship,” and no such modification is present in art. 101(a)(ii).53 This
discrepancy has not been explicitly elucidated by the International Law
Commission (ILC) or other legal scholars, but the plain language of the
text suggests that the purpose of art. 101(a)(i)’s modification is to limit
the potential objects of an act of piracy—apart from the victim ship
itself—to persons and property physically aboard the victim ship, to the
exclusion of property floating on the high seas. Ostensibly, such a
provision would have been drafted to avoid the absurd result of a ship
picking up seemingly abandoned cargo only to be accused of piracy
under the law of nations by the ship from which that cargo was lost.
Again, because ocean-going ships do not operate on land, such a
modification would not be applicable to piracy on terra nullius. These
51. Id. art. 101(a).
52. 1956 ILC Draft Articles, supra note 46, cmt. 1 at 282 (“Acts committed on
board a ship by the crew or passengers and directed against the ship itself, or against
persons or property on the ship, cannot be regarded as acts of piracy.”); IMO, Piracy,
supra note 44, at 5 (“In order to constitute an act of piracy under UNCLOS, an attack on
a ship must originate from another private ship or aircraft.”); see also Diana Chang,
Piracy Laws and the Effective Prosecution of Pirates, 33 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV.
273, 282 (2010); Jill Harrelson, Blackbeard Meets Blackwater: An Analysis of
International Conventions that Address Piracy and the Use of Private Security
Companies to Protect the Shipping Industry, 25 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 283, 298 (2010);
Milena Sterio, The Somali Piracy Problem: A Global Puzzle Necessitating a Global
Solution, 59 AM . U. L. R EV. 1449, 1468 (2010) (“[T]he Convention on the High
Seas/UNCLOS piracy definition requires the presence of two vessels for an act to qualify
as piracy—an aggressor vessel must attack a victim vessel. Therefore, if hijackers board
the victim vessel at its last port of entry and then overpower the ship’s crew on the high
seas, this act would not constitute piracy under the Convention on the High
Seas/UNCLOS definition, because only one vessel is involved. While some scholars
have argued that two vessels may not be required under the Convention on the High
Seas/UNCLOS definition, the majority view and the plain reading of these conventions
indicate that their drafters envision the presence of two vessels in their definition of
piracy.”).
53. UNCLOS supra note 33, art. 101(a).
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differences explain the existence of both arts. 101(a)(i) and (a)(ii) as
separate sub-sections and the textual differences between them. The
asymmetrical drafting could quite plausibly have been the result of the
drafters’ preference for natural language over parallel sentence structure
combined with the practical, mundane differences between piracy on the
high seas and piracy committed on terra nullius.
Even still, the interpretive task proponents face is not to develop a
unified theory of UNCLOS art. 101. Rather, it is limited to posing two
plausible readings of art. 101 and rendering it ambiguous as to a high
seas requirement for facilitators. Such ambiguity appears to be present.
Opponents argue the purpose of the phrase “on the high seas” is to
distinguish art. 101(a)(i) from art. 101(c) by placing a high seas requirement
on direct perpetrators but not facilitators of piracy. Proponents assert its
purpose is to distinguish art. 101(a)(i) from art. 101(a)(ii), thereby
distinguishing piracy on the high seas from piracy on terra nullius and
including both under the definition of piracy jure gentium. Opponents and
proponents of a high seas requirement for facilitators are both able to
advance a plausible reading of UNCLOS art. 101 that leads to the desired
conclusion. This renders the meaning of art. 101 ambiguous as to a high
seas requirement for facilitators and invites inquiry into other areas,
including the UNCLOS provisions surrounding art. 101, to determine its
true meaning.
B. The Statutory Context Surrounding UNCLOS Art. 101
Suggests a High Seas Requirement
Confining the analysis of a high seas requirement for pirate facilitators
to the text of art. 101 alone might result in a split decision, but the
context of art. 101 suggests piracy can only be committed on the high
seas. Reading arts. 86, 100, and 105 of UNCLOS alongside the plain
language of art. 101 provides evidence of the existence of a high seas
requirement for facilitators of piracy jure gentium.
Art. 86, “Application of the provisions of this Part,” introduces Part
VII of UNCLOS.54 It reads, “[t]he provisions of this Part apply to all
parts of the sea that are not included in the exclusive economic zone, in
the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State, or in the

54.

Id. art. 86.
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archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State.”55 This provision seems to
suggest that Part VII of UNCLOS, containing art. 101, only concerns
itself with that which occurs outside the territorial jurisdiction of states.
Indeed, one could go so far as to say that art. 86 incorporates itself by
reference (“The provisions of this Part”56) into all articles contained in
Part VII, including art. 101, and limits them to high seas acts.
Additionally, and perhaps more persuasively, art. 100 describes the
duty of all States to cooperate in repressing piracy, but it limits that duty
to piracy that occurs “on the high seas or in any other place outside the
jurisdiction of any State.”57 Art. 100 touches on a State’s duty to repress
piracy as opposed to its power to do so,58 but art. 105 continues where
art. 100 leaves off and limits a State’s power to seize “a pirate ship or
aircraft, or a ship or aircraft taken by piracy” to seizures occurring “[o]n
the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State.”59
The importance of art. 105 cannot be overstated since it codifies
universal jurisdiction over piracy jure gentium.60 Indeed, proponents
could rely on a syllogism created by using UNCLOS arts. 101 and 105,
respectively: the facilitation of piracy is itself piracy; universal jurisdiction
over piracy only exists on the high seas; therefore, universal jurisdiction
over facilitation only exists on the high seas.
For opponents, this sort of contextual argument may be viewed as
overly simplistic and contrived. However, such complaints do not change
the fact that there is an abundance of textual evidence surrounding art.
101 that suggests a high seas limitation and no statutory context
whatsoever that suggests the absence of such a requirement. The implicit
lack of a high seas requirement for facilitators would appear somewhat
out of place in the context of the accompanying UNCLOS provisions. In
many ways, the same conclusion can be reached by looking at the
drafting history of UNCLOS art. 101.

55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. art. 100.
58. Id.
59. Id. art. 105.
60. Eugene Kontorovich, International Legal Responses to Piracy off the Coast of
Somalia, AM. SOC’Y INT’L L., 13 ASIL INSIGHTS (Feb. 9, 2009), http://www.asil.org/
insights090206.cfm; see also ROBIN GEIß & ANNA PETRIG, PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY
AT SEA: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR COUNTER-PIRACY OPERATIONS IN SOMALIA AND
THE GULF OF ADEN 149 (2011).
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C. The Drafting History of UNCLOS Art. 101 Suggests a
High Seas Requirement
Like its statutory context, the drafting history of UNCLOS art. 101 is
best characterized by evidence of a high seas requirement for pirate
facilitators that is convincing, if not dispositive, particularly due to the
lack of evidence mitigating such a requirement. This section traces the
history of piracy’s definition under international law as it relates to
facilitators, beginning with the Harvard Draft Convention of 193261 and
ending fifty years later with UNCLOS.62 The language of the provisions
contained in these instruments, when read alongside their respective
commentaries, suggests that the line between the 1932 Draft Convention
and UNCLOS is a relatively straightforward one, further suggesting that
an inquiry into the drafting history of UNCLOS art. 101 could properly
consider texts other than UNCLOS itself, where such an approach might
otherwise be unwarranted.
1. 1932 Harvard Draft Convention on Piracy
The starting point for any historical inquiry into UNCLOS art. 101
must be Harvard’s 1932 Draft Convention on Piracy.63 The Draft
Convention was the result of a League of Nations decision in 1924 to
codify certain aspects of international law that were ripe for codification.64
After reviewing the existing state of the law and sending detailed
questionnaires to various states, Harvard Law School completed its Draft
Articles in anticipation of the first Conference for the Codification of
International Law, to be held in 1930.65 Though this conference did not
bear much fruit, Harvard’s work on piracy formed the basis for
subsequent discussions of the definition of piracy jure gentium by the
International Law Commission, the United Nations, and its Member States.
Both the text and commentaries of the 1932 Draft Convention on
piracy strongly suggest a high seas requirement for facilitators. As for
the text of art. 3 of the Draft Convention, the article providing the definition
61. Harvard Draft Convention, supra note 23.
62. UNCLOS, supra note 33, art. 101.
63. Harvard Draft Convention, supra note 23.
64. Francis Deák, Book Review, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 142, 142 (1930) (reviewing
Harvard Law School, Research in International Law, Draft Conventions on Nationality,
Responsibility of States, Territorial Waters).
65. Id.
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of piracy jure gentium, the drafters of the Harvard Convention chose the
following language: “Piracy is any of the following acts, committed in a
place not within the territorial jurisdiction of any state: . . . [a]ny act of
instigation or of intentional facilitation of [the direct commission of
piracy or the knowing and voluntary operation of a pirate ship].”66 This
language makes a high seas requirement for facilitators quite plain, but
the explanatory note accompanying art. 3 is even more explicit:
By this clause, instigations and facilitations of piratical acts, previously
described in the Article are included in the definition of piracy. Obviously,
convenience is served by this drafting device. The act of instigation or
facilitation is not subjected to the common jurisdiction unless it takes place
outside territorial jurisdiction.67

Thus there can be no doubt that, at least as of 1932, the general consensus in
the international community was that a facilitator of piracy must be
physically present on the high seas in order to be subject to universal
jurisdiction.
2. 1955 International Law Commission’s Debate on Maritime Piracy
The next time the definition of piracy under international law was taken
up in a comprehensive fashion was in 1955 when the ILC was preparing
its 1956 Articles concerning the Law of the Sea with commentaries.68
In preparing the Articles, the ILC not only used the Harvard Draft
Convention as a starting point for its discussion on piracy,69 but the Special
Rapporteur also explicitly endorsed both the Harvard Draft Articles and
the commentary attached to those articles:
Mr. FRANCOIS (Special Rapporteur) said that the subject of piracy had been
studied very thoroughly by the Harvard Research Centre, to which Professor
Joseph W. Bingham had submitted an exhaustive report, together with the text of a
draft international convention consisting of 19 articles published by the Harvard
Law School in 1932. He had felt that he could not do better than to take the
principal articles in Professor Bingham’s report, and the comments thereon,
as a basis for the discussion on the subject of piracy, dealt with in articles 23 et
seq of his own sixth report. His own draft had only six articles on piracy,
namely, articles 23 to 28. He had attached no comment to his individual articles,
that appended to the Harvard articles, to which he referred members, being
exhaustive and entirely satisfactory. 70

66. Harvard Draft Convention, supra note 23, at 743.
67. Id. at 822 (emphasis added).
68. 1956 ILC Draft Articles, supra note 46.
69. See Summary Records of the 290th Meeting, [1955] 1 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n
37, para. 29, at 39, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1955.
70. Id.
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From that general endorsement, the Special Rapporteur then turned to
the definition of piracy jure gentium, noting at the outset that the
definition was:
based on three important principles: the principle that animus furandi did not
have to be present; the principle that only acts committed on the high seas could
be described as piracy; and the principle that acts of piracy were necessarily
acts committed by one ship against another ship—which ruled out acts
committed on board a single vessel.71

At this early stage, the ILC appeared to favor an even narrower conception
of the high seas requirement for piracy jure gentium, citing Oppenheim
for the proposition that even acts that occur “by descent from the open
sea . . . on an island unappropriated by a civilized Power” do not fall
under universal jurisdiction.72 However, in an ILC meeting later that
year, the Commission voted 11 to 1 in favor of assimilating “to the high
seas territory not under the jurisdiction of any State” into the language of
the draft.73
After introducing and describing the three overriding principles from
the Harvard Draft Convention, the Special Rapporteur invited the ILC
members to vote on each of the three principles one by one.74 Of the ten
ILC members surveyed, two explicitly affirmed the Special Rapporteur’s
contention that universal jurisdiction over piracy was limited to acts on
the high seas, seven were silent as to a high seas requirement, and only
one specifically disavowed the high seas requirement.75 The lone dissenter,
French jurist Georges Scelle, argued against a formalistic definition for
piracy jure gentium and in favor of one based only on “the nature of the
act.”76 However, Scelle was rebuffed by the Special Rapporteur, who
opined that Scelle’s position resulted from “his keen concern to establish
an international police,” and noted that the adoption of his proposal “would
only serve to complicate the issue.”77
Then, in a subsequent 1955 ILC meeting, the Commission considered
a proposal by A. E. F. Sandström of Sweden to include acts perpetrated
71. Id. para. 32, at 40 (emphasis added).
72. Id. para. 48, at 41.
73. Summary Records of the 292nd Meeting, [1955] 1 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 51,
para. 24, at 53, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1955.
74. Summary Records of the 290th Meeting, supra note 69, para. 55, at 42.
75. See id. paras. 56–84, at 42–44.
76. Id. para. 70, at 43.
77. Id. para. 79, at 43.
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along the coast and within a state’s territorial jurisdiction in the definition of
piracy.78 The renewed debate gave Scelle a chance to clarify his position.
In doing so, he agreed that acts committed within the territorial jurisdiction
of a state would come under the jurisdiction of the local courts.79
However, according to Scelle, questions of jurisdiction had no bearing
on piracy’s definition under international law.80 In explaining his own
amendments, Sandström further stated that he wished to promote the
progressive development of international law rather than codify existing
law.81 Ultimately, Sandström’s proposed expansion was struck down by
six votes to four, with one abstention.82 The ILC debates began to move
the issue of a high seas requirement for piracy jure gentium from the
academic sphere to a more formalized structure.
3. 1956 ILC Draft Articles on Piracy
The ILC’s 1955 debate on maritime piracy culminated in the 1956
Articles concerning the Law of the Sea with commentaries (“Draft
Articles”). Discussion of the Draft Articles, which were eventually
incorporated into the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas, echoes
the ILC debates and stresses the importance of the Harvard Draft
Convention.83 To wit, the first of the ILC’s 1956 commentaries on piracy
reads:
In its work on the articles concerning piracy, the Commission was greatly
assisted by the research carried out at the Harvard Law School, which
culminated in a draft convention of nineteen articles with commentary, prepared
in 1932 under the direction of Professor Joseph Bingham. In general, the
Commission was able to endorse the findings of that research.84

Yet despite this endorsement, the ILC changed the form of its piracy
definition by moving the phrase, “in a place outside the jurisdiction of
any State” out of the chapeaux and into the body of the article.85 Opponents
have cited this amendment as evidence of the uncertainty around
whether the requirement survived the Harvard Draft Convention and
1955 ILC debates.86 However, the most natural reading of both the text

78. Summary Records of the 292nd Meeting, supra note 73, para. 9, at 52.
79. Id. para. 11, at 52.
80. Id.
81. Id. para. 16, at 53.
82. Id. para. 21, at 53.
83. United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599, 619 (E.D. Va. 2010).
84. 1956 ILC Draft Articles, supra note 46, cmt. 1, at 282.
85. Id., art. 39, at 282.
86. Jon Bellish, Breaking News from 1932: Pirate Facilitators Must Be Physically
Present on the High Seas, EJIL: Talk! (Sept. 19, 2012), http://www.ejiltalk.org/breaking-

134

BELLISH (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 15: 115, 2013]

10/20/2016 4:38 PM

A High Seas Requirement
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.

and subtext of the ILC’s commentary concerning the 1956 Draft Articles
suggests the amendment was made to differentiate piracy committed on
the high seas from that committed on terra nullius and to include them
both within piracy’s definition jure gentium. It therefore appears unlikely
the ILC made the amendment to differentiate acts of direct perpetration
from acts of facilitation and to place divergent jurisdictional limitations
upon each.
The text of the ILC’s commentary explicitly states, “[i]n considering
as ‘piracy’ acts committed in a place outside the jurisdiction of any
State, the Commission had chiefly in mind acts committed by a ship or
aircraft on an island constituting terra nullius or on the shores of an
unoccupied territory.”87 This intent is a clear departure from the language of
the Harvard Draft Convention definition (“in a place not within the
territorial jurisdiction of any state”),88 used in lieu of, not in addition to
and distinct from, the phrase “on the high seas.” Such a departure, if it
were meant to be more substantive in nature, would undoubtedly have
been worth noting in the commentary, especially in light of the ILC’s
strong general endorsement of the Harvard Draft Convention.
The subtext of the ILC’s commentary on art. 39 of the Draft Articles
further suggests that a high seas requirement for facilitators was
incorporated into the 1956 Draft Articles. The ILC commentary begins
by stating it “had to consider certain controversial points as to the essential
features of piracy.”89 It went on to list the conclusions reached for each
of the six points, namely that: 1) animus furandi is not required; 2) “private
ends” are required; 3) piracy can only be committed by a private ship; 4)
“[p]iracy can be committed only on the high seas or in a place situated
outside the territorial jurisdiction of any State, and cannot be committed
within the territory of a State or in its territorial sea”; 5) piracy can be
committed from a ship or an aircraft, and; 6) acts committed on board a
single ship cannot be regarded as piracy.90 Conspicuously absent from
the list is any mention of a high seas requirement for facilitators, save for

news-from-1932-pirate-facilitators-must-be-physically-present-on-the-high-seas/ (comment
by Douglas Guilfoyle, posted Sept. 20, 2012 at 11:22 AM).
87. 1956 ILC Draft Articles, supra note 46, cmt. 4, at 282 (noting that “outside the
jurisdiction of any State” could also refer to attacks by aircraft over a larger unoccupied
territory).
88. Harvard Draft Convention, supra note 23, at 743.
89. Id. cmt. 1, at 282.
90. Id.

135

BELLISH (DO NOT DELETE)

10/20/2016 4:38 PM

the explicit affirmation that as a general proposition piracy can only be
committed on the high seas or another place outside the territory of a single
state. 91 Thus, opponents’ claim that the transformation in piracy’s
definition between the 1955 ILC preparatory debates and the 1956 Draft
Articles is evidence of the demise of a high seas requirement for
facilitators does not withstand close scrutiny.
4. 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas and UNCLOS
The remaining history of piracy’s definition under international law as
it relates to incitement and intentional facilitation—from the 1956 ILC
Draft articles to UNCLOS in 1982—is relatively straightforward. Art. 39
of the 1956 Draft Articles appeared in the 1958 Geneva Convention on
the High Seas with several superficial grammatical changes and only one
substantive change: that an aircraft can be the victim of piracy on the
high seas.92 The definition in the 1958 Geneva Convention was copied
verbatim into UNCLOS art. 101, where it has remained untouched and
91. Bellish, supra note 86.
92. Compare 1956 ILC Draft Articles, supra note 46, art. 39, with Geneva
Convention, supra note 24, art. 15.
Article 39:
Piracy consists of any of the following acts:
(1) Any illegal acts of violence, detention or any act of depredation, committed
for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a
private aircraft, and directed:
(a) On the high seas, against another ship or against persons or property on
board such a ship;
(b) Against a ship, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of
any State.
(2) Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an
aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft.
(3) Any act of incitment or of intentional facilitation of an act described in
sub-paragraph 1 or sub-paragraph 2 of this article.
1956 ILC Draft Articles, supra note 46, art. 39.
Article 15:
Piracy consists of any of the following acts:
1.
Any illegal act of violence, detention or any act of depredation, committed
for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a
private aircraft, and directed:
(a) On the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons
or property on board such ship or aircraft;
(b) Against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the
jurisdiction of any State;
2. Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft
with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
3. Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph 1 or sub-paragraph 2 of this article.
Geneva Convention, supra note 24, art. 15.
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seldom discussed since its entry into force in 1982.93 To illustrate this,
despite its generally thorough nature, the seven volume treatise, United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary, gives
UNCLOS art. 101(c) relatively brief treatment, noting only that the
section exists, that attempts to commit piracy are not explicitly included
in the article’s application, and that, per UNCLOS art. 58, para. 2, the
definition of piracy applies to acts that take place within the exclusive
economic zone (EEZ) of a single state.94
Opponents will point to piracy’s treatment during the drafting of
UNCLOS alongside the chart in Part II, supra, and argue that the above
historical characterization should not be given much weight. They might
argue that, rather than speaking to the intent of the drafters, the history
of piracy’s definition jure gentium is the result of poor workmanship,
which itself stems from the simple fact that maritime piracy was not of
much import during the development of the positive international law on
the topic.95 Piracy’s reemergence was not predicted by many, if any,
scholars or practitioners of international law.
Yet the available evidence, though weaker than a strong proponent of
a high seas requirement might like, counsels against such an interpretation.
There is no question that the drafters of the Harvard Convention believed a
high seas requirement for facilitators existed, and there is nothing in the
subsequent history suggesting a deviation from that position. The ILC
explicitly endorsed the Harvard Draft Convention, debated the merits of
a high seas requirement, and seemed to conclude that, at least as a matter
of international law as it existed in 1955, universal jurisdiction only
existed over acts committed on the high seas. One year after the 1955
debate, the ILC re-worked the structure of the definition of piracy, but
the available evidence suggests that this modification left unchanged the
proposition that universal jurisdiction could not be asserted on individuals
operating solely within the jurisdiction of a state. There is nothing in the
remaining history to suggest that subsequent stewards of the definition
of piracy jure gentium ever intended to deviate from the guidance
contained in the 1932 Harvard Draft Convention.
93. UNCLOS, supra note 33, art. 101.
94. 3 CENTER FOR OCEANS LAW AND POLICY, UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA SCHOOL OF
LAW, UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY 202
(Myron H. Nordquist, Satya N. Nandan & Shabtai Rosenne eds., 1995).
95. See, e.g., Bellish, supra note 86 (comment by Douglas Guilfoyle, posted Sept.
20, 2012 at 11:22 AM).
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Moreover, even if it could be said with certainty that drafters from 1932
to 1982 simply failed to consider a high seas requirement for facilitators,
such a fact would hardly be sufficient evidence that the requirement no
longer exists. Customary international law cannot develop by accident but
requires state practice and opinio juris.96 The question of whether a high
seas requirement for facilitators of piracy exists should not be answered
using policy-favorable readings of UNCLOS’s text or its drafting history.
Rather, the inquiry should be based on a disinterested analysis of the text,
statutory context, and drafting history of UNCLOS alongside the underlying
policy rationale behind asserting universal jurisdiction over maritime
piracy. This final source of analysis—underlying policy rationale—will be
discussed in the following section.
D. The Possible Policy Rationales Behind Universal Jurisdiction
Over Piracy Suggest a High Seas Requirement
Though on balance, the textual, contextual, and historical analyses above
suggest the existence of a high seas requirement for facilitators, inquiry
into the underlying policy rationale behind piracy’s status as a crime of
universal jurisdiction may provide some additional insight. This section
will discuss six potential rationales for establishing universal jurisdiction
over pirates, explain the respective merits and demerits of each, and
consider their implications vis-à-vis a high seas requirement for
facilitators. The conclusion that flows from this analysis is similar to that
which resulted from the previous inquiries. Foundational principles of
international law combine with a faithful reading of history to make a
reasonably convincing case in favor of a high seas requirement, with only a
policy-favorable reading of that same history standing to rebut the case.
1. Inherent Heinousness—Against a High Seas Requirement
The most prolific, indeed the prevailing, rationale advanced to explain
piracy’s status as the paradigmatic universal jurisdiction offense is the
alleged inherent heinousness of the crime.97 This argument has carried a
96. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1031, 33 U.N.T.S. 993; PARRY AND GRANT ENCYCLOPAEDIC DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 109 (John P. Grant & J. Craig Barker eds., 2d ed. 2004); C.M. Chinkin, The
Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in International Law, 38 INT’L &
COMP. L.Q. 850, 857 (1989); Josef L. Kunz, The Nature of Customary International
Law, 47 AM. J. INT’L L. 662, 665 (1953).
97. See, e.g., EMMERICH DE V ATTEL, L AW OF N ATIONS bk. I, § 233 (1833)
(“[A]lthough the justice of each nation ought in general to be confined to the punishment
of crimes committed in its own territories, we ought to except from this rule those
villains, who, by the nature and habitual frequency of their crimes, violate all public
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great deal of weight because it is virtually undisputed that the crime of
piracy is the doctrinal foundation for the more recent push towards
universal jurisdiction over indisputably heinous crimes such as genocide
and torture.98 If it were true that piracy was the first crime to be viewed
by the international community as truly reprehensible, that fact would
militate against a high seas requirement for pirate facilitators. If universal
jurisdiction is predicated upon piracy’s heinousness, and customary
international law included facilitation of piracy in the definition of
piracy itself, it would be difficult to argue that something as formalistic
as a facilitator’s presence within the territorial jurisdiction of a state
protected him from a charge of piracy jure gentium.
Despite its success, this analogy appears overworked. According to
former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, the heinousness analogy
“has spread with extraordinary speed and has not been subjected to
systematic debate, partly because of the intimidating passion of its

security, and declare themselves the enemies of the human race. Poisoners, assassins,
and incendiaries by profession, may be exterminated wherever they are seized; for they
attack and injure all nations, by trampling under foot the foundation of their common
safety. Thus, pirates are sent to the gibbet by the first into whose hands they fall.”); 15
T.B. HOWELL, The Trials of Major Stede Bonnet, and Thirty-three others, at the Court of
Vice-Admiralty, at Charles-Town, in South-Carolina, for Piracy, A.D. 1718, in A
COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS 1231, 1235 (1812) (“As to the heinousness or
wickedness of [piracy], it needs no aggravation, it being evident to the reason of all
men.”); PROGRAM IN LAW AND PUB. AFFAIRS, PRINCETON UNIV., PRINCETON PRINCIPLES
ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 45–47 (Stephen Macedo ed., 2001) [hereinafter PRINCETON
PRINCIPLES], available at http://lapa.princeton.edu/hosteddocs/unive_jur.pdf, at 27 or 45
(listing piracy alongside slavery, war crimes, crimes against peace, crimes against humanity,
genocide, and torture as “Serious Crimes Under International Law”); A. Hays Butler,
The Doctrine of Universal Jurisdiction: A Review of the Literature, 11 CRIM. L.F. 353,
356 (2000) (describing a rationale that “focuses on the nature of the offence, rather than
its locale.”).
98. See, e.g., In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. 544, 556 (N.D. Ohio
1985) (“Piracy is the paradigm of an offense ‘against the common law of nations’. . . The
principle that the perpetrators of crimes against humanity and war crimes are subject to
universal jurisdiction found acceptance in the aftermath of World War II.”); Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980) (“[T]he torturer has become—like the
pirate and slave trader before him—hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind.”);
Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 147 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998) (analogizing torture to piracy as it relates to
universal jurisdiction); Eugene Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal
Jurisdiction’s Hollow Foundation, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 183, 195–96 (2004) [hereinafter
Piracy Analogy] (describing the evolution of the piracy analogy).
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advocates.”99 Professor Eugene Kontorovich summarized the troubled
nature of the heinousness rationale best, saying it “begins with what many
international lawyers believe should be the proper model of [universal
jurisdiction]—the moral enormity of the offense. Defining [universal
jurisdiction] as based on heinousness, the account then anachronistically
shoehorns piracy [universal jurisdiction] into that model.”100
The central flaw with the heinousness argument for universal jurisdiction
over piracy is that it woefully ignores the state practice of supporting
privateers, who performed the same acts as pirates with the same
motives, but who did so under the color of state authority.101 Rather than
being put to death for piracy, privateers were deemed to have not
committed a crime at all.102 All nations acknowledged the right of other
nations to authorize such commerce raiding, and privateering was a valid
defense against charges of piracy.103
The central consideration underlying the rebuttal of the heinousness
theory is that there was very little functional difference between the
individualized acts and intentions of pirates and privateers.104 Both groups
stole goods from non-combatants through the threat of violence, and made
good on that threat if goods were not turned over.105 Similarly, both groups
99. Henry A. Kissinger, The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction, 80 FOREIGN AFF.,
July-Aug. 2001, at 86, 86, available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/
article/163/28174.html; see also Steven W. Becker, Universal Jurisdiction: How Universal Is
It? A Study of Competing Theories, 12 PALESTINE Y.B. INT’L L. 49, 57 (2002/2003) (noting
the flawed nature of the heinousness rationale).
100. Eugene Kontorovich, Implementing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: What Piracy
Reveals About the Limits of the Alien Tort Statute, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 111, 137
(2004) [hereinafter Implementing Sosa].
101. See Piracy Analogy, supra note 98, at 210 (“Privateering was a form of nationally
sponsored piracy which reached its peak in the late 18th and early 19th centuries.
Privateers engaged in the exact same conduct as pirates: seizing merchant shipping
through threat of lethal force. Yet the latter were not subject to universal jurisdiction.
They were not even regarded as criminals, and a captured privateer would eventually be
repatriated to his home state.”) (internal quotations omitted).
102. DAVID CORDINGLY, UNDER THE BLACK FLAG: THE ROMANCE AND THE REALITY
OF LIFE AMONG THE PIRATES, at xvii–xviii (1995).
103. Piracy Analogy, supra note 98, at 210.
104. As will be explained in Part III(D)(3), infra, letters of marque and reprisal were
accompanied by instructions limiting the nations whose ships a privateer could plunder,
and the proceeds were distributed through a prize court. State sanction and formalized
processes certainly distinguish privateering from piracy as a general conceptual matter.
However, for the purposes of the inherent character of the acts and mental states under
which the acts were committed, the two are nearly identical.
105. Manuel Schonhorn, Postscript to DANIEL DEFOE, A GENERAL HISTORY OF THE
PYRATES 705 (Manuel Schonhorn ed., 1999) (1724) (“[I]t was the overwhelming numbers [of
men] on a pirate ship that prevailed, and usually without violence.”); Piracy Analogy,
supra note 98, at 214 (“If a merchant vessel would not surrender, privateers, like pirates,
would resort to arms.”).
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plundered for their own pecuniary gain.106 These similarities did not go
unnoticed. Courts openly recognized the similarity between piracy and
privateering, describing the former as “privateering without a commission
or letters of marque,”107 and noting that a commission to cruise determined
whether one was a pirate or not.108 Yet the pirate was subject to a death
sentence under universal jurisdiction while the privateer could receive no
penalty under any theory of jurisdiction.
Logically, if the act of armed robbery at sea for personal pecuniary
gain were so inherently heinous an act as to merit universal jurisdiction,
states would not have sanctioned it through the issuance of letters of
marque and reprisal. This purely formalistic approach to robbery at
seabelies the notion that universal jurisdiction over piracy arose because
of its heinousness. Although the heinousness rationale suggests the absence
of a high seas requirement for facilitators, state practice strongly suggests
that something other than the inherent heinousness of the offense was the
basis for universal jurisdiction for piracy.

106. Piracy Analogy, supra note 98, at 214 (“After the prize proceeding, the
government would take its share of the prize’s value (usually ten percent) and the rest
would be divided between the privateer’s owners, officers, and crew in accordance with
a formula set out in the ship’s articles.”). This is not to say that desire for personal
pecuniary gain is required to satisfy the “private ends” requirement, which is much broader. It
is only to say that personal pecuniary gain most certainly fits within the “private ends
requirement.” See, e.g., Harvard Draft Convention, supra note 23, at 857; Report of the
Sub-Committee of the League of Nations Committee of Experts for the Progressive
Codification of International Law, League of Nations Doc. C.196.M.70 1927 V, at 117
(1927) (“Certain authors take the view that desire for gain is necessarily one of the
characteristics of piracy. But the motive of the acts of violence might be not the prospect
of gain but hatred or a desire for vengeance. In my opinion it is preferable not to adopt
the criterion of desire for gain, since it is both too restrictive and contained in the larger
qualification ‘for private ends.’ It is better, in laying down a general principle, to be
content with the external character of the facts without entering too far into the often
delicate question of motives. Nevertheless, when the acts in question are committed from
purely political motives, it is hardly possible to regard them as acts of piracy involving
all the important consequences which follow upon the commission of that crime. Such a
rule does not assure any absolute impunity for the political acts in question, since they
remain subject to the ordinary rules of international law.”).
107. H.M. Advocate v. Cameron & Others, (1971) S.L.T. 202, 204 (Scot.).
108. United States v. Jones, 26 F. Cas. 653, 656 n.2 (C.C.D. Pa. 1813) (No. 15,494);
see also United States v. The Ambrose Light, etc., 25 F. 408, 417 (S.D.N.Y. 1885);
Davison v. Seal-Skins, 7 F. Cas. 192, 196 (C.C.D. Conn. 1835) (No. 3,661) (recounting
how the U.S. Navy released “a nest of pirates” from custody upon learning that they had been
acting under Argentinean commission).
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2. Protecting the Freedom of Navigation—Against a
High Seas Requirement
A separate, though closely related, account of universal jurisdiction
over piracy is that common jurisdiction was deemed appropriate because
pirates prey on global shipping lanes, disrupting the flow of international
commerce, which all states have an interest in protecting.109 Like the
heinousness rationale, universal jurisdiction based on the freedom of
navigation would suggest that a high seas requirement for facilitators
does not exist. If crimes affecting the freedom of navigation deserve
universal jurisdiction, then it should not matter whether a pirate financier
facilitates from land or the high seas.
In a sense, those who support this argument probably stand on more
solid ground than those who support the heinousness rationale. Protecting
international shipping lanes is based on a well-established principle of
the Westphalian system—freedom of the high seas—announced by Hugo
Grotius in the early 17th century.110 The heinousness rationale, on the
other hand, is based solely on an anachronistic reading of history driven
by contemporary policy preferences.
Nonetheless, state practice during piracy’s Golden Age undermines
the freedom of navigation rationale in the same way it does the
heinousness rationale. Since privateers and pirates performed the exact
same acts for the exact same reasons, they both disrupted the freedom of
navigation. Yet piracy was considered a crime of universal jurisdiction
while privateering was not a crime at all. The freedom of navigation
rationale, like the heinousness rationale, runs counter to the welldocumented state practice concerning privateers. A fair reading of history
suggests that both rationales were developed long after universal
jurisdiction was established over piracy. Neither rationale drove states’
decision-making process when they made piracy the first and only crime
of universal jurisdiction.

109. See, e.g., Harvard Law School, Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect
to Crime, with Comment, 29 AM. J. INT’L L. 435, 566 (Supp. 1935) (“The competence is
perhaps better justified at the present time upon the ground that the punishable acts are
committed upon the seas where all have an interest in the safety of commerce and where
no State has territorial jurisdiction.”); see also Georges Abi-Saab, The Proper Role of
Universal Jurisdiction, 1 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 596, 599–600 (2003) (noting how piracy
affects the international community at large, and that a state exercising universal
jurisdiction over a pirate is acting on behalf of the community).
110. See HUGO GROTIUS, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS (James Brown Scott ed.,
Ralph Van Deman Magoffin trans., 1916).
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3. Regulatory Capture—In Favor of a High Seas Requirement
There is another potential explanation of why piracy was the sole crime
of universal jurisdiction for centuries. Unlike the preceding two theories,
this one fully accounts for the disparate treatment afforded to pirates and
privateers. This rationale, if believed, counsels strongly in favor of
a high seas requirement for facilitators. It may even suggest that piracy
does not merit universal jurisdiction by modern standards. Simply stated,
the theory is that piracy’s status as a crime of universal jurisdiction was a
form of regulatory capture by states over the privateering industry. Under
this theory, states made a collective, mutually beneficial decision to allow
other states to engage in privateering. This scheme provided for all the
benefits of authorized privateering while simultaneously punishing with
death those who engaged in unauthorized privateering, i.e., piracy, from
which no state could derive benefit. The available historical evidence
suggests that privateering provided states with extensive political
and economic benefits, which gives substantial support for the theory of
regulatory capture.
The two main evidentiary sources in support of the regulatory capture
theory are the instructions that accompanied letters of marque and
reprisal, and state practice as it relates to prize law. From the seventeenth
to the nineteenth century, all seafaring states would issue letters of marque
and reprisal, which permitted the holder to seize ships and property on
the high seas.111 Often accompanying the letters of marque and reprisal
were instructions listing the conditions upon which the letter was issued.112
Though the contents of the instruction varied greatly, it always included
a provision limiting the privateer to attacking ships that belonged to
enemies of the issuing state.113 This practice allowed issuing nations to
exert political and even war-like pressure on geopolitical foes in peacetime
and wartime alike.114 Indeed, even the nomenclature of the practice, letters
of marque and reprisal, suggests a political purpose. Seafaring nations of
the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries saw privateering as
a convenient political tool, one they were unafraid to use.

111. Piracy Analogy, supra note 98, at 211.
112. See id. at 213.
113. Id.
114. See id. (“The Articles of Confederation explicitly authorized ‘granting letters
of marque and reprisal in times of peace.’”).
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In addition to political benefits, privateering produced lucrative gains
for both the privateers and the authorizing states. After a privateer
captured a ship, that ship and all the valuable property thereon were
taken back to the authorizing state and brought before a prize court.115
There, a judge would determine whether the prize was taken in accordance
with the instructions contained in the privateer’s letter of marque.116 If it
was, the court would sell the ship and distribute the proceeds of the sale
to the privateers, reserving a percentage for the state (usually around ten
percent).117 With the possibility of these funds flowing in fairly regularly
simply upon issuing letters of marque, it takes no stretch of the imagination
to see why such a financial arrangement seemed highly beneficial to the
states that utilized it.
Understanding piracy in this way makes universal jurisdiction over
pirates, and the uniform penalty of death imposed upon them, a relatively
straightforward proposition. Seafaring nations decided, either collectively or
simultaneously, that the political and economic benefits derived from a
country’s own privateering activities outweighed the possibility that their
merchants would be plundered by another nation’s privateers. However,
the cost-benefit analysis shifted dramatically when sea robbers declined
to follow the instructions on letters of marque, or sold the proceeds of a
successful plunder themselves, keeping the ten percent commission out
of their state’s coffers. Thus, the seemingly formalistic distinction between
pirates and privateers arose, a discrepancy that is no longer puzzling when
viewed from the perspective of a rationally self-interested seafaring state of
the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries.
The proposition that regulatory capture supports universal jurisdiction
over piracy is only a theory. Yet regulatory capture does a much better
job in explaining how the similarities between privateers and pirates
could coexist with such striking differences in treatment. If this theory
proved to be true, there would be few left to defend piracy’s status as a
crime of universal jurisdiction, let alone the application of universal
jurisdiction on facilitators operating within one state’s territory. Universal
jurisdiction over piracy would seem anachronistic and out of touch with
modern international criminal law. The next section offers a more charitable
explanation for piracy’s status as the first crime of universal jurisdiction.
It is at least as historically plausible as the theory of regulatory capture
and leads to the same conclusion: that a high seas requirement for pirate
facilitators exists under international law.

115.
116.
117.
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4. Evidentiary Shortcut—In Favor of a High Seas Requirement
The fourth possible policy rationale for universal jurisdiction over piracy
is qualitatively different from the three that precede it. Where the others
treated universal jurisdiction as an extension of a state’s traditional
jurisdictional powers under international law, this evidentiary shortcut
rationale treats universal jurisdiction as a proxy for those traditional
jurisdictional powers.118 Like the theory of regulatory capture described
above, this rationale has yet to take hold in most mainstream commentary.
Yet the logic behind it is fairly intuitive, and it accords with the theory
that states are rational actors. Professor Eugene Kontorovich, the original
author of this theory, describes the impetus behind it succinctly:
Because pirates injured many nations, many nations could exercise jurisdiction
under traditional rules. However, proving the existence of jurisdiction in any
specific cases could be very difficult. Pirate ships were almost never caught in
the act; rather, they were apprehended when they returned to port and attempted
to sell their booty. Unless the pirate ship was caught red-handed, the forum state
might have little evidence as to what particular nations’ ships the pirate had
attacked.119

In other words, absent universal jurisdiction, a prosecuting state would
need to prove either the defendant’s or the victim’s nationality to assert
criminal jurisdiction over that defendant. Asserting universal jurisdiction
over piracy was simply a tool of convenience to bypass the difficulties
associated with asserting criminal jurisdiction based on the nationality of
the defendant or victim without knowledge of either of those facts.
Providing further evidence that such an evidentiary shortcut was needed
is the fact that pirates and privateers alike worked hard to mask their
identities. 120 From flying multiple flags to repainting their ships, sea
robbers were nothing if not devious in their attempts to obscure their
national identities.121 With the nationality of the pirates and the victims

118. See Eugene Kontorovich, Universal Jurisdiction Over Non-Political Cases: An
Evidentiary Theory of UJ 22 (Dec. 4, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author) (“Universal jurisdiction over piracy is best understood as an evidentiary rule. It
facilitated the prosecution of the crime in cases where traditional territorial or nationality
jurisdiction existed but would be very difficult to affirmatively prove.”) [hereinafter
Evidentiary Theory].
119. Id. at 24 (emphasis in original).
120. Id.
121. See Matthew P. Harrington, The Legacy of the Colonial Vice-Admiralty Courts
(Part II), 27 J. MAR. L. & COM. 323, 342 (1996).
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totally obscure—facts that a prosecutor must prove to assert traditional
criminal jurisdiction—courts were left to assign jurisdiction based on the
nature of the crime rather than the nationalities of the individuals involved
in it.
Yet none of the problems associated with identifying pirates’ or
victims’ nationalities would apply to land-based facilitators. First, there
will always be at least one clear and provable traditional jurisdictional
nexus—the territory from which the facilitator operates—that could be
relied upon. Additionally, reaching a land-based pirate facilitator and
building a successful case against him would necessarily require fairly
specific information about the pirates he facilitated. Such information
would almost certainly include the pirates’ or victims’ nationalities. If
universal jurisdiction over piracy is thought of as a tool of convenience,
and none of the features giving rise to the need for that tool are present
in the case of land-based facilitators, it stands to reason that universal
jurisdiction was never intended to apply to land-based facilitators.
If the two previous theories or regulatory capture and evidentiary shortcut
are slightly obscure, the next two are squarely mainstream. Both
justifications, practical difficulty of enforcement and lack of implications
on sovereignty, find support in the works of scholars and jurists alike
and strongly suggest that a high seas requirement for facilitators exists.
5. Difficulty of Enforcement—In Favor of a High Seas Requirement
The first of the widely-advanced rationales for universal jurisdiction
over piracy that suggests a high seas requirement for facilitators is based
on the practical difficulty of capturing and trying pirates using traditional
law enforcement mechanisms. This justification is not simply based on
the fact that the crime is committed on the high seas,122 though that was
certainly an important aspect.123 Nor is it based on the notion that the
crimes associated with piracy were committed outside the territorial reach
of all nations because the crimes in question were in fact committed on
122. Implementing Sosa, supra note 100, at 151 (noting that murder on the high
seas was not originally subject to universal jurisdiction); see also United States v. Furlong,
18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184, 197–99 (1820).
123. See, e.g., Anthony Sammons, The “Under-Theorization” of Universal
Jurisdiction: Implications for Legitimacy on Trials of War Criminals by National Courts,
21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 111, 126 (2003) (suggesting that the actual rationale for
universal jurisdiction, as it arose in the context of piracy, was that pirates, “[t]hrough
their utilization of international waters, . . . operated beyond the territorial reach of any
single nation. For this reason, nations predicated their formulation of universal jurisdiction
over piracy on the notion that the crime usually was committed in terra nullius, such as
on the high seas where no nation exercised territorial control.”); see also Becker, supra
note 89.
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ships, which have long been recognized as territorial extensions of the
state of their flag of registration.124
Rather, the justification was even more practical. The pressures caused
by the widespread nature of the crime of piracy, its warlike characteristics,
the ease with which pirates could escape detection, and the high cost of
maintaining a naval force large enough to fight foreign foes and pirates
created the elements of necessity and urgency that lead to universal
jurisdiction over the crime.125
Under this rationale, the implications of a high seas requirement for
facilitators are clear. There is no reason to believe that those who facilitate
piracy from within the territorial jurisdiction of a state are any more or
less likely to escape detection than any other criminal within that state’s
boarders. Land-based facilitators neither engage in war-like tactics nor
seek to evade navies at sea. From a law enforcement perspective, a landbased pirate facilitator is no different from an individual facilitating
common armed robbery. If this practical rationale is accepted, the policies
underlying universal jurisdiction over piracy would not be served by
prosecuting territorial facilitators under the theory of universal
jurisdiction.
6. Lack of Implications on Sovereignty—In Favor of a
High Seas Requirement
A state’s criminal jurisdiction under international law is largely
coincident to that state’s sovereignty. 126 Consequently, the least
controversial form of jurisdiction is over that which occurs within a

124. Implementing Sosa, supra note 100, at 151; see also S.S. “Lotus,” supra note
21 at 7, 9, 22; OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 250–
52 (1991).
125. Implementing Sosa, supra note 100, at 152 (“The real problem was not the
formal jurisdictional status of the high seas but the practical problem of enforcement. . . .
The high cost of maintaining a navy, and the need to employ it against foreign fleets,
made piracy perhaps the most expensive of crimes to police. Because of the vastness of
seas, pirates could easily commit their crimes undetected.”); Abi-Saab, supra note 109,
at 600 (noting the “elements of necessity and urgency” created by “warlike act[s] by
highly mobile agents over the immensity of the high seas”).
126. Piracy Analogy, supra note 98, at 188 (“International law regards criminal
jurisdiction as a prerogative of sovereign states. As a result, the traditional limits on
national criminal jurisdiction are largely coextensive with the limits of national
sovereignty.”).
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state’s territorial limits.127 Additionally, states can assert jurisdiction over
acts committed by or against its nationals; some states have asserted the
protective principle of jurisdiction, wherein they may adjudicate acts
committed abroad by and against foreign nationals, but that nonetheless
affect certain important interests of the adjudicating state.128 In addition
to these more traditional bases for jurisdiction, universal jurisdiction
exists over certain specific and narrowly defined crimes. For the first
300 years of the Westphalian system of international law, this form of
jurisdiction was reserved exclusively for piracy committed on the high
seas.129
With these fundamental principles in mind, the final potential policy
rationale for universal jurisdiction over piracy is that such jurisdiction
does not offend the traditional notions of state sovereignty precisely
because the acts at issue occur on the high seas.130 If this rationale were
found to be most persuasive, there can be no question that a high seas
requirement for facilitators exists. Absent such a requirement, the
contemporary international law of maritime piracy would violate all
notions of sovereignty contained in the original justification for the
establishment of universal jurisdiction over the crime.
There is no shortage of support for the proposition that universal
jurisdiction is fundamentally different from other types of jurisdiction
because, “[u]nlike all other forms of international jurisdiction, the
universal kind is not premised on notions of sovereignty or state consent.

127. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 303 (5th ed. 1998)
(“The principle that the courts of the place where the crime is committed may exercise
jurisdiction has received universal recognition, and is but a single application of the
essential territoriality of the sovereignty, the sum of legal competences, which a state
has.”).
128. See Implementing Sosa, supra note 100, at 124 n.59 (describing the bases for
jurisdiction under international law and noting that “[t]he scope of the protective principle is
uncertain and controversial, because under loose notions of harm and causation it could
encompass a wide variety of extraterritorial conduct”); United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d
56, 110–11 (2d Cir. 2003) (“The protective (or ‘security’) principle permits a State to
assume jurisdiction over non-nationals for acts done abroad that affect the security of the
State.”) (citations omitted).
129. Eugene Kontorovich, “A Guantánamo on the Sea”: The Difficulty of Prosecuting
Pirates and Terrorists, 98 CAL. L. REV. 243, 244 (2010).
130. See, e.g., HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE
BANALITY OF EVIL 262 (rev. ed. 1965) (1963) (noting the pirate fell under universal
jurisdiction because “he has chosen to put himself outside all organized communities”
and he “acknowledg[ed] obedience to no flag whatsoever”); see also 4 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 71 (1979) (explaining that
pirates were universally punishable because they “renounced all the benefits of society
and government”).
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Rather, it is intended to override them.”131 As a result of its unique
nature, universal jurisdiction has traditionally been applied quite sparingly
for fear that excessive application might strain diplomatic relations between
states.132 Indeed, the practical consideration of interstate relations formed
the basis for two first principles of international law: the principles of
sovereign equality and noninterference.133 At the time when universal
jurisdiction was originally granted solely to prosecute pirates, the general
rule was: “no nation could have jurisdiction outside its sovereign domain
except with the consent of another nation.”134
From this perspective, whether a perpetrator of piracy was physically
present on the high seas at the time of the piratical act was of the utmost
importance. Only if a pirate renounced sovereign protection by operating
on the high seas, outside of the privateering licensing scheme, could he
be subject to universal jurisdiction.135 This view can be seen in the
writings of William Blackstone and Henry Kissinger alike.136 In fact,
131. Piracy Analogy, supra note 98, at 184; see also Schooner Exchange v.
McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136–37 (1812) (“The jurisdiction of the nation
within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no
limitation not imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an
external source, would imply a diminution of its sovereignty to the extent of the
restriction, and an investment of that sovereignty to the same extent in that power which
could impose such restriction.”); Nicolaos Strapatsas, Universal Jurisdiction and the
International Criminal Court, 29 MANITOBA L.J. 1, 6 (2002) (observing that universal
jurisdiction can threaten international relations “because [ assertions of universal
jurisdiction] could be interpreted by the State where the crime has been committed as . . .
a violation of its sovereignty”); Eugene Kontorovich, The “Define and Punish” Clause
and the Limits of Universal Jurisdiction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 149, 168 (2009) (“By granting
Congress the Define and Punish power, the Framers sought to provide a uniform
standard of conduct on federal vessels and to ensure that the national government could
deal with crimes that could embroil the country in disputes with foreign powers.”)
[hereinafter Limits of Universal Jurisdiction].
132. Implementing Sosa, supra note 100, at 125 (“Assertions of [universal jurisdiction]
by one nation can be perceived as interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
This can strain diplomatic relations and lead to interstate conflict.”).
133. LUC REYDAMS, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: INTERNATIONAL AND MUNICIPAL
LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 27 (2003) (“Currently there is no global convention with respect to
criminal jurisdiction. International law leaves States a wide measure of discretion in the
matter, yet postulates the existence of limits. One of them is the noninterference
principle, a corollary of the sovereign equality of States.”).
134. Limits of Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 131, at 172.
135. See Implementing Sosa, supra note 100, at 151 (“Pirates rejected their home
states’ licensing schemes, thus refusing their home states’ protection.”).
136. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 130; see also Kissinger, supra note 99, at 87
(“The very concept of universal jurisdiction is of recent vintage. The sixth edition of
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UNCLOS allows states to strip pirate ships of their national character,
further reflecting the concern surrounding issues of state sovereignty as
it relates to universal jurisdiction over pirates.137
If one accepts the premise that the principles of state sovereignty and
noninterference are fundamental to international law, and that the exercise
of universal jurisdiction profoundly offends those principles, it should
follow that acts committed wholly within a state’s jurisdiction should be
treated differently than those committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of
any state. The former should be exempt from judgment by a state with
no connection to the act while the latter could withstand a lesser nexus
under certain circumstances. If those who first asserted universal
jurisdiction over piracy understood international jurisdiction as such, it is
extremely unlikely that they intended to subject to universal jurisdiction
a facilitator of piracy who operated wholly within the territorial
jurisdiction of another state.
IV. THE PRACTICAL IMPACT OF THE HIGH SEAS
REQUIREMENT ON FACILITATORS
On the surface, it may appear that a high seas requirement for facilitators
of piracy jure gentium would result in impunity for the financiers of
modern maritime piracy off the coast of Somalia. The casual observer
might argue that, by eliminating universal jurisdiction as a potential
basis to bring a land-based facilitator to court, a high seas requirement
would cut off an important avenue to end impunity that would otherwise
have been available and widely used to combat piracy. As will be
demonstrated below, political economic theory suggests, and state
practice shows, that true universal jurisdiction prosecutions of alleged
pirates are exceedingly rare. In other words, a high seas requirement for
facilitators would have few implications on impunity for pirate kingpins.
This section first looks at a state’s decision whether to pursue a universal
jurisdiction piracy prosecution through the lens of political economic
theory and concludes that it is rarely in a state’s interest to undertake
such a prosecution. This theoretical analysis leads to two testable hypotheses:
first, universal jurisdiction prosecutions should represent an extreme
minority of the outcomes facing a suspected pirate; second, the overall
Black’s Law Dictionary, published in 1990, does not contain even an entry for the term.
The closest analogous concept listed is hostes humani generis (‘enemies of the human
race’). Until recently, the latter term has been applied to pirates, hijackers, and similar
outlaws whose crimes were typically committed outside the territory of any state.”).
137. UNCLOS, supra note 33, art. 104 (“A ship or aircraft may retain its nationality
although it has become a pirate ship or aircraft. The retention or loss of nationality is
determined by the law of the State from which such nationality was derived.”).
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clearance rate138 for maritime piracy should be lower than that for other
crimes. The section concludes by surveying relevant state practice and
finding the hypotheses posed to be largely accurate.
A. In Theory, Universal Jurisdiction Piracy Prosecutions
Should be Exceedingly Rare
For the purposes of this section, let us assume that states act in
accordance with the modern version of the rational choice model of
states. The rational choice model explains why states are unitary, rational
actors in pursuit of their own interests on the world stage.139 Unlike the
realist camp, which argues that states pursue only short-term plans to
increase power relative to other states, the modern version allows for more
breadth in a state’s conceptualization of its own interests.140 Once
shunned by international lawyers, the rational choice model analysis is
becoming more widely accepted, and the marketplace is now viewed as
one of the most useful analogies for international relations.141 This type
of political economic analysis suggests that market forces discourage
universal jurisdiction piracy prosecutions. This is true whether such
prosecutions are viewed as a commons problem or as a public goods
problem. This section will consider both potential framings in turn.
1. Universal Jurisdiction Prosecutions as a Commons Problem
A 1968 essay by Garrett Hardin described the lamentable situation of
a large group of herders sharing common grazing land.142 Each herder
enjoyed the full benefit of adding an additional cow to the pasture but
only suffered a fraction of the cost of that additional cow because all the
herders shared the degradation of the grazing land.143 Assuming all of
the herders were rational beings, an over-grazed and un-productive pasture
was an economic inevitability.144 Hardin’s solution was to privatize the

138. The clearance rate is the ratio of offenders sent for prosecution to the total
number of known offenders.
139. Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for
International Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT’L L. 335, 349–51 (1989).
140. Id. at 351.
141. See id. at 375.
142. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968).
143. Id.
144. See id.
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common property and compel each herder to both enjoy the full benefit
and pay the full cost of his actions.145 This solution, dubbed “mutual
coercion, mutually agreed upon,” led to the economically and socially
optimal result.146
Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons is thus fundamentally a story about
internalizing externalities. Externalities arise whenever the conduct of a
market actor unintentionally affects the circumstances of another market
actor; they come in two forms: positive and negative.147 Negative
externalities, like the land degradation described in Hardin’s essay, occur
when a market participant acts in a way that is detrimental to another
participant.148 Positive externalities, conversely, arise when a market
participant acts in a way that benefits other participants.149 In either case,
a community where externalities are present will benefit by internalizing
those externalities, which will in turn lead to participants engaging in the
externality-causing activity at more nearly optimal levels.150 Indeed, Coase
famously argued that if certain conditions are met, market participants
will naturally work towards internalizing externalities over time.151
Just as one herder adding an additional cow to the common pasture
creates a negative externality, universal jurisdiction prosecutions of
pirates create a positive externality. The prosecuting state bears all the
cost of a complex prosecution, while the entire community of nations
benefits from the deterrent effect of that prosecution on future pirates.
And to be sure, universal jurisdiction prosecutions, of pirates and nonpirates alike, are both politically and economically costly for the prosecuting
state.152 Just as herders with unaccounted-for negative externalities will
perform too much of a damaging activity, states with unaccounted-for
positive externalities will perform too little of a beneficial activity.
145. Id. at 1247.
146. Id.
147. Abbott, supra note 139, at 388–89; WILLIAM H. RIKER & PETER C. ORDESHOOK,
AN INTRODUCTION TO POSITIVE POLITICAL THEORY 256 (1973).
148. Abbot, supra note 128, at 388–89; RIKER & ORDESHOOK, supra note 136, at
257–58.
149. Abbot, supra note 128, at 389; RIKER & ORDESHOOK, supra note 136, at 258.
150. Abbott, supra note 139, at 390.
151. See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. AND ECON. 1
(1960).
152. Evidentiary Theory, supra note 118, at 15 (noting that wealthy states pursue
universal jurisdiction prosecutions in a way that minimizes political and economic cost);
REYDAMS, supra note 133, at 222 (observing that universal jurisdiction prosecutions are
a luxury that only wealthy nations can afford); Garry J. Bass, The Adolf Eichmann Case:
Universal and National Jurisdiction, in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: NATIONAL COURTS
AND THE PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 77, 78 (Stephen
Macedo ed., 2004) (noting the possibility that a universal jurisdiction prosecution could
lead to diplomatic difficulties with other nations).
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Piracy cases prosecuted by a state with a more traditional jurisdictional
basis are more successful at internalizing externalities than universal
jurisdiction prosecutions. Through prosecutions under the territorial,
nationality, or protective principles of jurisdiction, the prosecuting state
can further secure its territory, vindicate the rights of its nationals,
demonstrate to the international community its responsibility over its
nationals, or protect an important state interest. The prosecuting state still
bears the entire cost of the prosecution, but it enjoys more of the resulting
benefits, namely that which flows from the interests territorial, national,
or protective jurisdiction are meant to advance. Under this formulation,
both Hardin and Coase would predict that very few states would pursue
universal jurisdiction piracy prosecutions.
2. Universal Jurisdiction Prosecutions as a Public Goods Problem
In addition to thinking about universal jurisdiction prosecutions in
terms of commons problems and externalities, one can also think of them
in terms of public goods and free riders to reach the same conclusion that
universal jurisdiction prosecutions should be quite rare. Upon accepting
the premise that universal jurisdiction prosecutions are public goods and
that states are rational actors, economic theory inevitably leads to the
conclusion that market pressures will force a decrease in the rate of such
prosecutions.153
Public goods have the two identifying characteristics of “jointness” and
“non-excludability.”154 By jointness, economists mean that consumption of
a good by one user does not reduce the availability of that good for other
users.155 Non-excludability means that all participants can enjoy the benefit
of a good, regardless of whether that user takes part in producing it.156 In

153. See Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis of
International Law, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 16 (1999) (noting that, to the extent that
something is a public good, theorists expect them to be under-produced by a market
acting alone); see also RAYMOND G. BATINA & TOSHIHIRO IHORI, PUBLIC GOODS:
THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 15 (2005) (describing the conditions leading to the underproduction of public goods).
154. Abbott, supra note 139, at 377; John A. C. Conybeare, Public Goods, Prisoners’
Dilemmas and the International Political Economy, 28 INT’L STUD. Q. 5, 6 (1984); see
also WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 314–
15 (10th ed. 2006); RIKER & ORDESHOOK, supra note 147, at 247, 259–64.
155. Abbott, supra note 128, at 377.
156. Id.
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the case of a pure public good, “the marginal cost of providing another
agent with the good is zero, and . . . no one can be excluded from enjoying
its benefits.”157 Put another way, a pure public good is consumed equally
by all market participants, regardless of whether any given participant
actually contributed to the production of the good in question.
Universal jurisdiction piracy prosecutions, or perhaps more accurately,
the benefits that flow from universal jurisdiction piracy prosecutions,
appear to be a prime example of a public good. By definition, universal
jurisdiction prosecutions are performed by states with no territorial,
national, or protective connection to the piratical act or acts at issue.158
Thus, the core benefits of a universal jurisdiction prosecution, from the
perspective of the state conducting the prosecution, are limited to the
deterrent effect of that prosecution on future would-be pirates and the
increased stability on the high seas resulting from that deterrence.159
This deterrent effect, even if modest, is enjoyed by all nations who
engage in or benefit from maritime transport, regardless of whether that
nation participates in conducting universal jurisdiction piracy prosecutions.
The benefits flow automatically from the mere existence of the prosecution,
and no additional expense is required for the non-prosecuting state to share
in those benefits. Although it is not the case that all nations share in

157. BATINA & IHORI, supra note 153, at 2.
158. PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, supra note 87, at 28.
159. The prosecuting state has the additional benefit of improved standing within
the international community for performing its duty to cooperate in the repression of
piracy as articulated in UNCLOS art. 101. This benefit is not a public good, but states
tend to cite the deterrence rationale more frequently than the duty rationale, although
commentators often discuss both simultaneously. Additionally, the duty rationale does
not represent the unanimous position of scholars. See, e.g., Agence France-Presse, UN
calls for tougher prosecution of pirates, THE RAW STORY (Nov. 19, 2012, 7:55 PM),
http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2012/11/19/un-calls-for-tougher-prosecution-of-pirates/ (“The
United Nations on Monday called for stronger prosecutions of pirates and more action by
shipping companies to deter bandits at sea.”); Thomas Kelly, U.S. Dep’t of State’s
Principal Deputy Assistant Sec’y, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Remarks at
Combating Piracy Week: The U.S. Government’s Approach to Countering Somali Piracy
(Oct. 25, 2012), available at http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rm/199929.htm (“Now let me
turn to another aspect of our response – our efforts to deter piracy through effective
apprehension, prosecution, and incarceration of pirates and their supporters and
financiers. . . . Prosecutions is one key to deterrence, but this must include the prosecution of
the masterminds and funders along with the gunmen.”); but see Elizabeth Andersen et.
al., Suppressing Maritime Piracy: Exploring Options in International Law 9 (One Earth
Future Found., Academic Council on the U.N. Sys., & Am. Soc’y of Int’l Law,
Workshop Report) (“Some commentators read these and other provisions as creating a
duty for states, which many are neglecting. Kenya, by this interpretation, would be seen
as fulfilling its affirmative duty by prosecuting pirates on its soil. Other commentators
reject this interpretation, arguing that the concept of universal jurisdiction permits, but
does not require, states to prosecute maritime pirates.”).
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the benefits equally, since those more intimately or frequently involved in
maritime transport accrue a marginally greater benefit from piracy’s
repression than states whose connection is more tenuous, it is highly
likely that all nations share in the benefit to some extent.160 Thus it is
reasonable to conclude that the benefits flowing from a universal
jurisdiction piracy prosecution have nearly all the characteristics of a
public good.
Once it can be established that something has the characteristics of a
public good, it is almost axiomatic that the good will be under-produced
in a functioning market.161 This under-production is a result of the wellknown problem of free-riding, where entities who incur no costs in
creating a public good nonetheless obtain the full benefit of that good.162
Much has been made of what must be done to counteract the public
good/free-rider problem and ensure public goods are produced at a socially
optimal level. The most famous of these approaches is Samuelson’s
“first-best” provision of pure public goods,163 which states, “[a]t the firstbest social optimum the public good should be supplied so that the sum
of the willingness-to-pay (WTP) for those who benefit from the good is
160. This is because piracy has a generalized impact on the cost of trade, and
almost all of the world’s goods are transported at sea. Sami Bensassi & Inmaculada
Martínez-Zarzoso, How Costly is Modern Maritime Piracy for the International Community?,
20 REV. INT’L ECON 869, 870 (2012), available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/
10.1111/roie.12000/pdf (finding that maritime piracy cost the international community
$24.5 billion in terms of trade destruction in 2012); Int’l Mar. Org., IMO’s contribution
to sustainable maritime development 3 (IMO Brochure), http://www.imo.org/ourwork/
technicalcooperation/documents/brochure/english.pdf (noting that 90% of the world’s
trade is carried at sea).
161. Dunoff & Trachtman, supra note 153, at 16; see BATINA & IHORI, supra note
153, at 15.
162. See Abbott, supra note 139, at 378 (“[B]ecause of free-riding, [collective goods]
are typically supplied at less than optimal levels, if at all.”); Tim Besley, Thiemo Fetzer
& Hannes Mueller, One Kind of Lawlessness: Estimating the Welfare Cost of Somali
Piracy 4 (Int’l Growth Ctr., working paper, Apr. 20, 2012), available at http://www.theigc.org/
publications/working-paper/piracy-somalia-costs-billions (“One of the central difficulties
in combatting predation due to piracy is the need for international cooperation. There is a
classic public good problem with the usual potential for free-riding.”).
163. See Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV.
ECON. & STAT. 387, 387–89 (1954); Paul A. Samuelson, Diagrammatic Exposition of a
Theory of Public Expenditure, 37 REV. ECON. & STAT. 350, 350–56 (1955); Paul A.
Samuelson, Aspects of Public Expenditure Theories, 40 REV. ECON. & STAT. 332, 332–
38 (1958); Paul A. Samuelson, Pure Theory of Public Expenditures and Taxation, in
PUBLIC ECONOMICS: AN ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION AND THEIR
RELATIONS TO THE PRIVATE SECTORS (J. Margolis & H. Guitton eds., 1969).
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equal to the marginal production cost.”164 In other words, states should
pay for the public good proportionately to its perceived benefit from that
public good.
Such a mechanism is much easier to describe than to implement, and
although various attempts have been advanced to achieve socially optimal
results for public goods problems,165 the issue remains a vexing one.166
Fortunately, in the specific case of universal jurisdiction piracy
prosecutions, the public good exists alongside a more privatized substitute:
piracy prosecutions under a traditional theory of jurisdiction. With a
universal jurisdiction prosecution, the benefit to the prosecuting state
comes in the form of deterrence, a benefit which flows to t he
international community as a whole. On the other hand, a more traditional
prosecution produces additional benefit(s) for the state of securing its
territory, vindicating the rights of its nationals, demonstrating responsibility
over its nationals to the international community, or protecting an
important state interest. Therefore, traditional piracy prosecutions look
significantly less like a public good than their universal jurisdiction
counterparts and are more likely to be produced in a market.
Consequently, if one assumes states enter into a cost-benefit analysis
when deciding whether to engage in complex international prosecutions,
cases brought under traditional theories of international jurisdiction
should be more common than those brought under the theory of universal
jurisdiction. In both instances, traditional and universal jurisdiction piracy
prosecutions, the economic cost of a prosecution is relatively high.167 Yet
there are political costs associated with universal jurisdiction prosecutions
that are less present in more traditional cases.168 These political costs come
164.
165.

BATINA & IHORI, supra note 153, at 9.
E.g., Erik Lindahl, Just Taxation—A Positive Solution, in CLASSICS IN THE
THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 168 (Richard A. Musgrave & Alan T. Peacock eds., Elizabeth
Henderson, trans., 1958) (1919).
166. See BATINA & IHORI, supra note 153, at 1 (“[O]ne of the biggest problems [in
welfare economics] is that there is a class of goods that provides utility or improves the
efficiency of production, but which the private sector has great difficulty providing,
public goods.”).
167. Eugene Kontorovich, “A Guantánamo on the Sea”: The Difficulty of Prosecuting
Pirates and Terrorists, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 243, 245, 262–66 (2010) (describing the
difficulties inherent in piracy prosecutions, including establishing and proving who is a
pirate, preserving evidence obtained on the high seas, and providing adequate counsel
and translation services).
168. Evidentiary Theory, supra note 118 (“The exercise of universal jurisdiction is
politically costly for a state. It means embroiling one’s diplomatic apparatus in an imbroglio,
and, quite likely, a confrontation with one or more states . . . it means burdening one’s
court system with what will probably be an incredibly complex and problematic case;
and it almost certainly means a great deal of domestic turmoil and controversy. Why
would a country bother?”); see also Michael Kirby, Universal Jurisdiction and Judicial
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in the form of potential friction between states, overly burdened domestic
dockets, and a frustrated public.169 Moreover, while costs are traditionally
borne by the prosecuting state, virtually all of the benefits of a universal
jurisdiction prosecution flow instead to the international community.170
Under traditional jurisdictional theories, more benefits flow directly to
the prosecuting state. This is true whether one speaks in terms of
internalizing externalities arising out of a commons problem or privatizing
public goods to avoid a free-rider problem.
B. State Practice Shows Universal Jurisdiction Piracy
Prosecutions Are Rare
The above economic analysis leads to two related hypotheses. First,
for all the reasons stated above, universal jurisdiction piracy prosecution
should represent a small minority of all outcomes that befall a suspected
pirate. Second, as a more general matter, high seas piracies should be
prosecuted at a lower rate than similar domestic crimes. This is because,
even if costs are minimized and internalized to the greatest extent
feasible, the cost of any given piracy prosecution will be higher than an
inherently simpler prosecution of, for example, a domestic bank robber.
This is due to practical difficulties inherent in piracy prosecution but rare
in domestic armed robbery trials, including evidence preservation,
provision of counsel and translation services, and prisoner transfer and
repatriation issues. Moreover, even if a state with a traditional
jurisdictional nexus engages in a piracy prosecution, such engagement
does not negate the deterrent benefits that flow to the international
community. This leaves behind two market forces, positive externalities
and characteristics of a public good, that will continue to drive down the

Reluctance: A New “Fourteen Points”, in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: NATIONAL COURTS AND
THE PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 240, 256 (Stephen
Macedo ed., 2004) (noting that domestic judges, especially those with heavy caseloads,
are likely to resent universal jurisdiction prosecutions).
169. See Evidentiary Theory, supra note 118; Kirby, supra note 168; see also Beate
Lakotta, An Expensive Farce: Germany’s Somali Pirate Trial Is Pointless, SPIEGEL ONLINE
INTERNATIONAL (Sept. 12, 2012, 10:24 AM), http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/
German-trial-of-somali-pirates-turns-into-pointless-and-expensive-farce-a-855252.html
(expressing frustration over a Somali piracy trial in Germany).
170. In recent years, the international community has worked out a “cost-sharing”
mechanism for regional universal jurisdiction prosecutions. This mechanism will be
discussed in Part IV(B), infra.
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rate of piracy prosecutions. This section tests the two above hypotheses
against the available empirical evidence and finds that both have held
true historically and in the modern context.
1. Universal Jurisdiction Piracy Prosecutions Are a Minority Outcome
Empirical evidence suggests universal jurisdiction prosecutions have
represented, and continue to represent, a small minority of all piracy
outcomes. For example, Alfred P. Rubin in 1998 surveyed piracy
prosecutions over the past three hundred years and found fewer than five
universal jurisdiction prosecutions.171 Though this figure does not include
unreported universal jurisdiction prosecutions that took place in remote
regions, with only five enumerated trials, universal jurisdiction prosecutions
almost certainly represented a vanishingly small proportion of all piracy
outcomes between 1698 and 1998.172 It is also worth noting that as early
as 1867, universal jurisdiction piracy prosecutions were being thought of in
terms of internalized costs and externalized benefits:
Besides [England is] not the only Power with large interests at stake. French,
Americans, and Germans carry on an extensive trade . . . Why should we then
incur singly the expense of suppressing piracy if each provided a couple of
gunboats the force would suffice for the safety foreign shipping which is all that
devolves upon . . . why should the English tax payer alone bear the expense? 173

Eugene Kontorovich and Steven Art picked up where Rubin left off
and conducted an empirical study of piracy prosecutions from 1998 to
2009, which includes the first few years of the resurgence of Somali
piracy.174 They found only seventeen universal jurisdiction piracy
prosecutions out of the 1158 reported attacks.175 Broken down further,
Kontorovich and Art found a universal jurisdiction prosecution rate of
0.53% for the years 1998 to 2007 and universal jurisdiction prosecution
rate of 3.22% for the years 2008 and 2009.176
State practice from 2008 to 2012 shows that the international community
has taken steps to minimize the cost of universal jurisdiction prosecutions

171. See ALFRED P. RUBIN, THE LAW OF PIRACY 346–47 n.13, 348 n.50 (2d ed. 1998);
see also Piracy Analogy, supra note 88, at 192 (“[V]ery few criminal prosecutions for
piracy can be found that depended on the universal principle.”).
172. See id.
173. Besley et. al., supra note 162, at 4 (quoting The London and China Telegraph
from Feb. 4, 1867) (alteration in original).
174. Eugene Kontorovich & Steven Art, An Empirical Examination of Universal
Jurisdiction for Piracy, 104 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 436, 436 (2010), available at www.asil.
org/ajil/July2010selectedpiece.pdf [hereinafter Empirical Examination].
175. Id. at 444.
176. Id. at 445.
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and has recognized a commons/public goods problem that is inherent in
such prosecutions.177 By pursuing a strategy that directs prosecutions
towards regional nations and funds them largely through United Nations
mechanisms, the international community is both minimizing the cost of
piracy prosecutions and spreading that cost more equitably among the
nations most directly benefitting from the prosecutions. Nonetheless, a
universal jurisdiction prosecution remains a low-probability outcome for
a captured pirate. A traditional universal jurisdiction prosecution would
result from the capturing state conducting the prosecution of a pirate
captured on the high seas.178 However, capturing states choose to simply
release captured pirates eighty to ninety percent of the time.179 In response
177. See, e.g., EU Naval Force Transfers Twelve Suspect Pirates to Mauritius for
Prosecution After Attack on Merchant Vessel off Somalia, EU NAVFOR SOMALIA (Jan.
25, 2013, 3:23 PM), http://eunavfor.eu/eu-naval-force-transfers-twelve-suspect-piratesto-mauritius-for-prosecution-after-attack-on-merchant-vessel-off-somalia-2/ (noting the
prisoner transfer agreement between the European Union and Mauritius); Support to the
Trial and Related Treatment of Piracy Suspects, COUNTER-PIRACY PROGRAMME ISSUE 6
(U.N. Office on Drugs & Crime), June 2011, available at http://www.unodc.org/documents/
Piracy/UNODC_Brochure_Issue_6_WV.pdf (describing the UNODC’s capacity building
efforts); Support to the Trial and Related Treatment of Piracy Suspects, COUNTER-PIRACY
PROGRAMME I SSUE 7 (U.N. Office on Drugs & Crime), Sept./Oct. 2011, at 1, available
at http://www.unodc.org/documents/Piracy/UNODC_Brochure_Issue_7_WV.pdf (identifying
the Piracy Prisoner Transfer Programme).
178. UNCLOS, supra note 33, art. 105 (“On the high seas, or in any other place
outside the jurisdiction of any State, every State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a
ship or aircraft taken by piracy and under the control of pirates, and arrest the persons
and seize the property on board. The courts of the State which carried out the seizure
may decide upon the penalties to be imposed, and may also determine the action to be
taken with regard to the ships, aircraft or property, subject to the rights of third parties
acting in good faith.”) (emphasis added).
179. See Empirical Examination, supra note 174, at 450 (noting that anti-piracy
patrols continue to release most of the captured suspects); Brian Brady, Navy frees four
out of five suspected Somali pirates, THE INDEPENDENT (Apr. 8, 2012), http://www.
independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/navy-frees-four-out-of-five-suspected-somali-pirates7626977.html (citing official UK Ministry of Defence numbers that 28 of the 34 ships
boarded in 2008 were released and that 229 of the 279 pirates detained were released);
First Italian Judgment in a piracy Case: Public Prosecutor of Rome Condemns
Four Somali Pirates, OCEANUS LIVE (Oct. 31, 2012, 1:48 PM), http://www.ocean
uslive.org/main/viewnews.aspx?uid=00000545 (“Italy had adopted in the past against
pirates the technique of ‘catch and release’, ie [sic] delivering pirates to the states to which
they belong. This technique has been criticized by the UN Security Council because it
was considered an incentive problem.”); US Planning, MARITIME SECURITY REVIEW
(Mar. 17, 2011), http://www.marsecreview.com/2011/03/us-planning/ (“The prosecution
of pirates is difficult. Jurisdiction is tricky, and stakeholder countries are often unwilling
or unable to put them through their court systems. Out of an estimated 800 who have
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to this elevated “catch and release” rate, nations conducting naval patrols
have signed transfer agreements with regional nations including Kenya,
Seychelles, Tanzania, and Mauritius, whereby the capturing state transfers
the pirates to a regional nation to undergo a universal jurisdiction
prosecution financed and supported by the United Nations and the
governments of other states.180 This approach recognizes and seeks to
ameliorate the market forces described above by moving toward a situation
where states’ financial contributions to piracy prosecutions are
proportionate to the benefits accrued through those prosecutions.
Nonetheless, despite the concerted effort to increase the rate of universal
jurisdiction prosecutions to date, such prosecutions remain a relatively
rare occurrence.
2. Maritime Piracy is Prosecuted at a Lower Rate than Other Crimes
Apart from predicting that a universal jurisdiction prosecution would
be a rare outcome for a suspected pirate, the political economic theory
discussed above would also predict the overall rate of piracy prosecutions to
be lower than that of domestic offenses. Because prosecution rates are
not generally reported by states, clearance rates are used as a proxy for
prosecution rates.181 A crime is “cleared” when a suspect is arrested and
referred for prosecution.182 The clearance rate is thus the ratio of those
referred for prosecution to the total number of known offenders.
In the United States, the clearance rate for all violent crimes is roughly
forty-five percent, and twenty-seven percent for robbery.183 In the European
Union, the clearance rates are even higher, with a clearance rate of seventy

been turned over for prosecution, no witness could say how many had actually been
prosecuted when grilled by Larsen. The closest they got to an answer was ‘very few.’”).
180. E.g., Judicial international cooperation to end impunity, EUR. UNION EUROPEAN
EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE, http://eeas.europa.eu/piracy/judicial_cooperation_en.htm (“The
EU has therefore signed transfer agreements with countries in the region—the Seychelles
(2009), Mauritius (2011)—and is negotiating another one with Tanzania. At the moment,
transfers to Kenya are possible on a case by case basis. The judicial systems of these
countries were not fully prepared to cope with the additional complexities and workload of
transferred piracy suspects. A joint EU/UNODC programme of support for the justice
system in Kenya was launched in May 2009 to provide Kenya with practical assistance
to cope with the extra demands associated with the prosecution and detention of piracy
suspects (€1.75 million). Similar support programmes are available to the Seychelles
(€0.78 million) and Mauritius (€1.08 million). The EU and its Member States are thus
the largest contributor to the UNODC counter-piracy programme.”).
181. Empirical Examination, supra note 174, at 446.
182. Id. n.43.
183. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 2008 CRIME IN THE
UNITED STATES: PERCENT OF OFFENSES CLEARED BY ARREST OR EXCEPTIONAL MEANS
tbl.26, (2009), available at http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2008/data/table_26.html.
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percent for homicide and forty-one percent for robbery.184 The average
clearance rate for all crime worldwide is fifty-one percent.185 Compare those
percentages to the 1.47% rate at which captured pirates were sent for
prosecution between 1998 and 2009.186 If anything, that 1.47% rate is on
the high side since it is well documented that a substantial fraction of pirate
attacks go unreported.187 At best, the clearance rate for piracy is between
sixty and eighty percent lower than the global average for all crimes.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The available evidence suggests that an inciter or intentional facilitator
of maritime piracy must be physically present on the high seas to be
subject to universal jurisdiction. The drafters of the 1932 Harvard Draft
Convention on Piracy made it clear that incitement and intentional
facilitation of piracy were included as a matter of convenience, essentially
allowing for guilt by association. Rather than forcing the prosecuting
state to show that each individual aboard a suspected pirate ship personally
committed an act of piracy, or personally participated in operating the
ship, mere presence aboard the ship would be enough to sustain a
conviction.188 While it would be fair to say the reasoning employed by
the Harvard Draft Convention was repeatedly endorsed throughout the
next fifty years, at the very least it is clear that subsequent stewards of
piracy’s definition under international law never explicitly deviated from
the initial conclusion that facilitators must be on the high seas to be
subjected to universal jurisdiction. Any arguments to the contrary rest on
a policy-favorable reading of UNCLOS and its history, mistaking
pronouncements concerning piracies committed on terra nullius with
those related to the creation of separate jurisdictional requirements for
direct perpetrators and facilitators.
Furthermore, a high seas requirement is not likely to result in impunity
for pirate kingpins who never leave dry land. From the premise that
states are rational actors seeking to maximize self-defined benefits from
184. Ming-Jen Lin, Does democracy increase crime? The evidence from international
data, 35 J. COMP. ECON. 467, 471 (2007) (citing Interpol figures).
185. Empirical Examination, supra note 174, at 447.
186. Id. at 444–45.
187. Pirate attacks under-reported, forum told, EDMONTON JOURNAL (Feb. 9, 2012),
http://www2.canada.com/edmontonjournal/news/business/story.html?id=4ddff96f-a9ed-44
e6-9c9b-27dbca7f9f2b.
188. See Harvard Draft Convention, supra note 23, art. 3.
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operating on the world stage while minimizing the cost of doing so, it
follows naturally that universal jurisdiction piracy prosecutions are not
necessary to reach pirate financiers and facilitators. The costs of such
prosecutions are high and relatively fixed, regardless of which state
conducts the prosecution. The benefits, however, are further internalized
and therefore maximized when the state conducting the prosecution has
a more substantial connection to the defendant. Moreover, the international
nature of global shipping, combined with multiple avenues of sovereigntybased international jurisdiction, results in a situation where even if one
state with jurisdiction is unwilling or unable to prosecute, other states
with traditional connections will be available to fill in the gap. For the
reasons described above, states with more traditional jurisdictional nexuses
are more likely to prosecute than those relying solely on universal
jurisdiction.
The answer to Chief Justice Marshall’s question thus remains unchanged
by the two centuries that passed between United States v. Palmer and
United States v. Ali. It cannot be believed that piracy jure gentium
encompasses “the subject of a foreign prince, who, within the dominions
of that prince, should advise a person, about to sail in the ship of his
sovereign, to commit murder or robbery.”189 As it relates to the modern
resurgence of east African piracy and the financiers and facilitators who
turned that resurgence into an international criminal epidemic, that might
not be such a terrible thing.

189.
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Palmer, supra note 1.

